

The American Response to Regionalism in Europe

Equal Partners or Rivals?

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Historically, the relationship between America and Europe has frequently been characterized by either conflicts or differences of opinion. The differences have been many, even though America was founded by Europeans. At the end of World War II, which claimed millions of lives, the world witnessed a new war which did not claim as many lives, yet was even more terrifying; the Cold War. The world faced a more apocalyptic reality during this war; the possibility of global destruction as a result of the nuclear bomb. The two superpowers, who stood tall after the destruction of Europe, each claimed their right to lead the world. These were the U.S., with its system of capitalism and democracy, and the Soviet Union, with its Communism and dictatorship. This time the battleground was not physically in Europe, the two superpowers fought each other indirectly in other parts of the world. However, the importance of control over Europe was well understood by both parts. Each held on to their own region, the Americans in the West and the Russians in the East – dividing Europe into two different spheres of influence.

Over the last years, and especially since the second war in Iraq started, the literature on the strains on the relationship between Europe and America has flourished. A term like “transatlantic drift”¹ has been coined by Geir Lundestad to explain how the distance between the two has increased. Also, Niklos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras have released a collection of essays and documents which suggests how to deal with the transatlantic rift between Europe and America². In addition, Svein Melbye writes about the basic differences which enhance the rift between the U.S. and the European Union.³ Other scholars like Noam Chomsky⁴ and Francis Fukuyama⁵ understand and worry about the current state of transatlantic relations. The second Iraq war is one issue of

¹ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Europe after 1945: From "Empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift* (Oxford University Press, 2003).

² Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras, *EU-US Relations: Repairing the Transatlantic Rift* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2006).

³ Svein Melbye, *Bush Revolusjonen i Amerikansk Utenrikspolitikk* (Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co. (W. Nygaard), 2004).

⁴ Noam Chomsky, *Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post 9-11 World* (London: Henry Holt and Company, 2005).

⁵ Francis Fukuyama, *After the Neocons. America at the Crossroads* (London: Profile Books, 2006).

disagreement, but there are several other factors which all put pressure on the relationship. Europe and America seem to have moved further and further away from each other, even though their relationship is still characterized by interdependency. Reasons for the apparent change are many, and so are the different opinions and analyses of the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic community.

This thesis concentrates on a specific aspect of the Euro-American relationship, namely American responses to European regionalism. Furthermore, the intent here is to perform a historical and theoretical analysis of two periods, the Cold War and the War on Terror. The goal is to find out if American responses have changed or remained mostly the same during these two periods.

The analysis of American responses to European regionalism during the Cold War covers a large period of time, and limitations are necessary. This thesis shall therefore concentrate on the Cold War period from 1945 to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in 1986 as the background context. Emphasis on the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan will be more in depth because responses in these periods were stronger than previous administrations. In addition, during these periods there are important events which highlight the issue of American responses towards European integration; Kennedy's visit to Berlin, Nixon and the end of the Vietnam War, and Reagan and his hard-line policy towards the Soviet Union. However, the analysis section will be limited to only a part of the Cold War. The analysis section of this thesis focuses on the period from 1969 to 1977, which Geir Lundestad has labeled as "Conflict and Cooperation: American Western European Relations (not) Redefined." The reason for this is that this was the period in which Europe started to appear more on its own, and will thus make a good object for analysis. Furthermore, this thesis analyzes American responses to European regionalism from 2001 up until the present, and compares this period to the selected time period of the Cold War.

1. 2 Theories and Methods

At the centre of this evaluation are a number of different theories. The idea is to define these theories, and weigh their relative usefulness in explaining evolving American responses to regionalism in Europe. The interesting part of this investigation

is to discover to what degree the theories apply to both the period of the Cold War and the War on Terror, or if they are less helpful or not suitable at all as explanatory models.

Geir Lundestad's theory of "empire by invitation" is central in explaining the relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe during the Cold War. This theory shows how Europe welcomed American leadership for protection against Communism and aid in rebuilding its national economies. Even though it is clear that Lundestad's theory is well renowned and respected, it will be tested critically. Furthermore, "empire by invitation" will be applied to the period of the War on Terror, and the goal in this section is to establish whether the theory also can explain American responses to European regionalism in this period. Furthermore, Geir Lundestad's book "The United States and Europe after 1945: From 'Empire' by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift" shall provide the historical background for this thesis.

Another important theory is Bjørn Hettne's theory of "The new regionalism", which explains how the European regionalist project developed over time. This theory is useful in describing how Europe evolves from a divided continent of individual states into the supranational European Union. "The new regionalism" will be applied to both the Cold War period and the War on Terror period, and tested critically.

The notion of "defensive realism" as described by Robert Jervis, and to a certain extent as presented by Fareed Zakaria in his critique of the theory, is useful when analyzing American foreign policy toward Europe during the Cold War. The idea of "defensive realism" is that states expand due to insecurity, and it is this notion together with the security dilemma that will be the basis for the analysis of the Cold War and the War on Terror periods. Both these periods have a similar scenario where the U.S. confronts an enemy and its foreign policy is strongly reflected by this. In addition, the American need for security has had and still has an effect on its relationship to Europe, more particularly European integration.

This thesis supplements "defensive realism" by using Fareed Zakaria's theory of "State-centered Realism" in order to explain American foreign policy towards Europe. Zakaria's theory emphasizes how states expand their interest abroad when experiencing an increase in state power. The relevance of this theory will be tested first on the period of the Cold War, where the U.S. emerged as strengthened and became the first superpower after World War II. In this context, the U.S. expanded its influence in Europe when its power was at a peak. America's role as the only superpower in the

world after the end of the Cold War will be the main focus during the analysis of the War on Terror period.

Finally, the notion of “cultural hegemony” as described by Antonio Gramsci will serve as an explanation of the extent of American ideology’s influence on Europe. Especially during the Cold War the impact of American culture and capitalist system was substantial, and “cultural hegemony” will be tested to see how well this notion explains the historical events and the relationship between Europe and the U.S. The period of the War on Terror will also be subject for analysis, and the goal in this section is to establish how well Gramsci’s notion applies to American culture’s dominance in Europe today.

1.3 The Cold War and European Regionalism

In the course of further development of international revolution there will emerge two centers of world significance: a socialist center, drawing to itself the countries which tend towards socialism, and a capitalist center, drawing to itself the countries that incline toward capitalism. Battle between these two centers for command of world economy will decide fate of capitalism and of communism in the entire world.⁶

The American interest in Europe after World War II was increased due to the fear of Communism, and the U.S. promoted regionalism here in order to prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence in Europe. Furthermore, Western Europe welcomed American leadership as it was in need of aid to rebuild its national economies. At the same time, it needed protection and security guarantees from the danger of an emerging Communist threat. American and West-European interests coincided in all areas at first, and this was an important reason why the U.S. supported and promoted regionalism in this area. However, the Soviet Union had control over Eastern Europe and thus Europe was divided into western and eastern blocks. The division of Europe into two spheres of influence, each dominated by the two superpowers, remained during the whole period of the Cold War.

⁶ George Kennan, “Long Telegram,” (Truman Presidential Library and Museum, Harry S. Truman Administration File, Elsey Papers, February 22, 1946), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=2&documentid=6-6&documentdate=1946-02-22&studycollectionid=coldwar&groupid= (accessed April 2, 2007).

After the Cold War, the European regionalist project grew into a more independent power bloc, which turned out to be different than what the U.S. had anticipated. America's plan for an integrated Europe involved a strong regional actor capable of holding its own defense and saving U.S. tax dollars, and contributing to the security of the U.S. Furthermore, the integrated Europe was expected to always be on America's side, and it is here one can see a root of conflict. A stronger, united Europe that disagreed with the U.S. did not, and most likely does not, sit well with Washington. However, this development of a stronger Europe on the international arena occurred mostly on an economical level. Europe has not yet developed a common foreign policy or a single European army. In that context it is not a superpower militarily. Even so, America did not seem to have reaped what it thought it had sown when it first encouraged regionalism after World War II. A Europe which became more independent and self-sufficient could not be influenced or pressured as easily as before.

The U.S. had expectations and goals, many which were obtained during the early years of the Cold War. These goals were to limit Soviet expansion, fitting Western Europe into an Atlantic framework and the rearmament of West Germany. In addition, America's overriding goal was to keep Communists in Western Europe out of power. On the cultural side, The United States wanted Western Europe to be open for American culture, as well as the rest of the world. However, as Western-Europe and later the European Union, grew more and more into something akin to region-state on the economic level, America found that it did not possess the authority and power that it once had towards Europe. Nor did it have the support or willingness of Europe to cooperate solely on American terms anymore.

1.4 The War on Terror

This war will not be waged by a grand alliance united for the single purpose of defeating an axis of hostile powers. Instead, it will involve floating coalitions of countries, which may change and evolve. Countries will have different roles and contribute in different ways. Some will provide diplomatic support, others financial, still others logistical or military. Some will help us publicly, while others, because of their circumstances, may help us privately and secretly. In this war, the mission will define the coalition — not the other way around.⁷

⁷ Donald Rumsfeld, "A New Kind Of War," (U.S. Department of Defense, The New York Times, September 27, 2001), <http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=440> (accessed April 2, 2007).

After the terrorist attacks on America in 2001, the idea of a form of American hegemony became more important than ever, and even the notion of an American empire was used instead of hegemony. Richard A. Falk published “The Declining World Order. America’s Imperial Geopolitics” in 2004 and in this book he criticizes, amongst other things, the foreign policy of the Bush administration after 9/11. He argued that the Bush administration had plans of global domination and that America was establishing itself as an empire by military might.⁸ This emphasis on America as a hegemon resurfaced mainly due to how the administration of George W. Bush announced and conducted the War on Terror in the first years after 9/11.

How does the idea of American hegemony fit in with the reality of a growing European regionalism? And how has the war on terror affected the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic? Some argue that the EU can now be seen as a “threat” to American unilateralism and global domination. Seeing the world through a realist lens, can the EU in the future fill the role as a superpower and a counterweight to the U.S., and in this context, what are the American responses to this hypothetical reality? By “realist” this thesis uses the classic term as described by Hans J. Morgenthau, where states seek power and security in the international system⁹. Even so, the differences between America and Europe are not as comprehensive as they were between the two superpowers during the Cold War. Is a relationship characterized by power struggle really a realistic scenario? These are not two sworn enemies with different ideologies fighting for influence in the world. However, the question is whether the U.S. sees the EU as an ally and partner, or as a competitor. America is now realizing that the War on Terror cannot be won without allies, which might perhaps contribute to an improvement in the relationship between the two.

⁸ Richard A. Falk, *The Declining World Order. America’s Imperial Geopolitics* (New York: Routledge, 2004).

⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, “Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,” Fifth Edition, Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978, pp. 4-15), <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/morg6.htm> (accessed February 22, 2007).

1.5 A Comparison

It is interesting to compare the American response to regionalism during these two periods, because it shows how global threats can have an effect on America's relationships with others. This thesis suggests that these two periods are well suited for explaining American responses to European regionalism due to their similarities. During the Cold War the relationship between America and Europe was characterized by a form of mutual dependency and fear of a common enemy. Europe needed the U.S. for protection from financial ruin and as a security guarantee. The U.S. needed Europe to achieve its main goal, which was a deterrent to the Soviet Union. According to Geir Lundestad it is clear that even though the U.S. possessed greater economic and military power, Europe did have leverage towards America. Centrist governments were promoted by the U.S. in Europe, and these possessed leverage in the sense that America found the alternatives to be disagreeable. The American desire to make Europe more integrated as a deterrent against Soviet expansion, led to the U.S. sacrificing some of its interests in order to achieve a greater goal. For example, economic interests had to pay the price for the integration of Europe, something which was widely debated, especially in the private sector in the U.S. Since European integration was the overall goal, sacrifices had to be made. This was particularly clear in the area of agriculture where European protectionism would damage American export, but the U.S. postponed addressing the matter in order for the further economic integration of Europe to continue. A more thorough discussion of this will be included in chapter three of this thesis.

There must not be any doubts however, that Europe was much weaker than the U.S. and in desperate need of all forms of aid during the early years of the Cold War. No kind of leverage could change this fact. Still, the key element in the Cold War for this thesis was the strong American desire for European regionalism. In providing a deterrent against Communism, European integration was clearly instrumental. This was essential for American security, and the system of capitalism. Furthermore, as Europe would be able to support its own military defense, American tax dollars would be saved. After all, American military presence in Europe did not come cheap. Despite disagreements over agriculture, the U.S. knew that a growing European market would be in the interest of America in the future. Strong support from the U.S. together with internal initiatives in Europe made integration possible.

The American response to regionalism during the War on Terror tends to be different from the Cold War period, as is the relationship between Europe and America, and the balance of power in the world. The EU has evolved into something resembling a superpower itself, even though its military integration is poorly developed. However, its economic and political power is indisputably considerable. It has evolved into one of the major actors on the world arena, but more as a soft power than a hard power. The EU can be said to have a stronger power of attraction than the U.S. has. Its success in integrating and expanding makes it a model for others to follow. A definition of a superpower in this thesis is an actor which has at its disposal instruments which other powers do not have. The EU possesses the ability to combine soft and hard power in a successful manner, making it a “Metrosexual Superpower.”¹⁰

It may seem easy to draw a parallel to the Cold War in describing the two sides of the Atlantic (and the rest of the world) as facing a common enemy. One of several significant differences in the present situation lies in the fact that the integrated Europe is now more of an equal than a cluster of allies in desperate need of aid. It is capable of disagreeing more strongly and will not be pushed as easily as before. In a post-Cold War world, the EU prefers to work through diplomacy instead of war, and this is one issue of disagreement between Europe and the U.S. Clearly, its initial positive response to European integration must have been affected by the reactions following the Iraq War, amongst other things. Does a fully integrated Europe serve American interests best, or is it better with a division of Europe? Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s comments on “Old Europe and New Europe” certainly makes us think that American responses to European integration really have changed. And the EU is definitely divided in giving the U.S. its support, as was shown by the reactions to the war in Iraq.

1.6 Outline of the Thesis

This chapter outlines the content of this thesis, and specifies the goals for the analysis of the American response to European regionalism.

¹⁰ Paragh Khanna, “The Metrosexual Superpower,” *Foreign Policy* 16 (August 2004), Yale Global Online, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4366> (accessed February 24, 2007).

Chapter 2 introduces the theories which are much of the basis for the analysis in this thesis. The first of these is regionalism as presented by Bjørn Hettne and Richard A. Falk. Following this is Geir Lundestad's theory of "Empire by Invitation" which provides the central perspective of the thesis on the historical background. Robert Jervis' theory of defensive realism and Farheed Zakaria's theory of state-centered realism are central parts in explaining American foreign policy. Finally, the theory of hegemony, as originally presented by Antonio Gramsci, forms the basis for the debate concerning American hegemony's relevance to European-American relations in the two periods examined in the thesis.

Chapter 3 discusses the central aspect of the relationship between the U.S. and Europe during the period of 1969 to 1977 of the Cold War that is examined in the thesis, America's strong interest in the European regionalist project. Was this positive attitude towards European integration born from a moral and sympathetic view of helping Europe get back on its feet? Was it just meant to serve America's own interest both economically and militarily, or did it result from a combination of these and other factors? After inviting the Americans in for protection against Communism, Europe developed into a significant power bloc itself which later moved further away from total American control. Did the Americans foresee this change, and what was their response to the changing reality? This part of the thesis focuses primarily on a preliminary evaluation of existing theoretical interpretations of this aspect of Euro-American relations, rather than the historical processes and events involved in America's response to regional integration in Europe. How and how well the existent theories explain the events is therefore the basis of this part of the thesis. Furthermore, one section of this chapter deals with how the different presidential administrations responded to regionalism in Europe during the period of 1945 to 1985. The intent of this short overview is to establish if there are patterns to be found in American responses during this period, and in that context some administrations shall be covered more in depth than others. Finally, the role of NATO during the Cold War is discussed. Firstly, the intent is to examine the importance of the organizations as a means of containing Communism. Secondly, this thesis considers to what degree NATO has functioned as the glue which has held America and Europe together.

Chapter 4 discusses how the U.S. responded after 9/11, which led to the War on Terror, and how these events affected U.S.-European relations. It also discusses the impact of the war in Afghanistan with emphasis on how the U.S. has been supported by

Europe in its war against the Taliban regime. The angle in this chapter is focused on how the War in Iraq further deepened the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic, as European opposition grew strong against American unilateralism in its policy toward Iraq. Furthermore, this chapter discusses and analyzes political, and to a certain extent, historical differences between America and Europe, and to what extent these have demonstrably affected US responses to continuing European integration. Does the U.S. feel that the European Union has played out its role and performed its purpose? Is European opposition to American unilateralism viewed by important policymakers as a hindrance to U.S. plans? Or does it still perform a useful role? American relations with the former Soviet states of Eastern Europe seem to show that there is a certain degree of loyalty to the U.S. there. Considering the experiences of these states during the Cold War, it is not hard to see why maintaining a good relationship with America is important to them. Could this be dividing Europe, and in that context will division in Europe be in America's interests? An important part of this chapter is the role of NATO since 9/11 compared to its role during the Cold War. From being the glue which held Europe and America together, it may be argued that the organization has been transformed into an instrument for the execution of American policy. Finally, this chapter establishes whether the theories from chapter two also apply to U.S. responses to regionalism during the current war on terror.

Chapter 5 draws conclusions based on the previous chapters and determines whether there are patterns or changes when looking at American responses to European regionalism during the two periods.

Chapter 2: Theories

2.1 Introduction

The basis for this chapter is a set of theories and notions, which will try to explain the dimensions of the relationship between Europe and America during the Cold War, and more importantly, the American response to European integration in this period. The goal is to establish whether these theories are able to explain the historical events and the actions taken by the U.S. regarding regionalism in Europe in a time where bipolarity was at its peak. This chapter starts by defining the theories, while the discussion concerning their relevance and explanatory power continues in chapter 3.

Geir Lundestad is one of Norway's leading historians and his works on the relationship between Europe and the America are deeply renowned. His theory of "Empire by Invitation", which he began in the 1908s is frequently cited by other scholars. The core concept of this theory is how Western Europe invited the U.S. into Europe to take leadership and provide economic assistance as well as military protection from the Soviet Union.

Bjørn Hettne is a professor at the Peace and Development Research Institute at Gothenburg University in Sweden. His theory, "The New Regionalism", explains how regionalism develops from within

Robert Jervis is a professor at Columbia University and known for his work concerning international relations. His notions of "Defensive Realism" argue how states expand to increase and maintain their own security. This thesis shall test how these notions can help to explain American responses towards regionalism in Europe during the Cold War and the War on Terror.

Fareed Zakaria is specializing in foreign affairs and international relations. His theory of "State-centered Realism" argues how states expand when they experience an increase in their power. This theory shall be applied to how the U.S. responded to regionalism in Europe during the Cold War and the War on Terror.

Antonio Gramsci was an Italian political theorist who is seen as one of the original Marxist thinkers. His work concentrates on analysis of culture and political leadership. This thesis shall use his thoughts of "Cultural Hegemony", and establish

whether these can provide a better understanding of America's influence on Europe, both during the Cold War and the War on Terror.

2.2 Geir Lundestad: "Empire" by Invitation 1945-50

After World War II, Europe was in ruins, and the power the states in this region once possessed had been reduced to almost nothing. In order to build up their countries and economies, the nations of Europe were in great need of help from the outside. In addition, there were other dangers, such as the one posed by the Soviet Union. Europe, in its current state, could not offer any resistance to the emerging Communist threat from the East. The answer to all these problems was to be found in assistance from America.

According to Lundestad, the Americans were invited into Europe with the sole purpose of helping Europe get back on its feet and to offer protection from the Russians. At this time, many were afraid that the U.S. would return to its isolationist policy from the interwar years. The British government was particularly occupied with creating bonds between America and Europe. Furthermore, at the economical level, all countries agreed on the necessity of American assistance. These nations were actively encouraging a bigger role for the U.S. in European politics, and with this came increased influence for the U.S. The nations of Western Europe invited the U.S. to Europe, and the Americans accepted the invitation. This was mostly because the U.S. supported the policies which these nations' governments stood for. However, the aid was not given without terms; Europe had to give something back. The trade inside the region had to be liberalized, the contact with Eastern Europe had to be limited, and the U.S. demanded a certain degree of influence on some of the countries' economic policies.

The relationship between America and Europe changed over time. More specifically, when the aid from the U.S. was certain, and nations had secured help, they started to criticize elements of American policy which did not appeal to Europe. Even so, during the first years after the war, the interests of both parties coincided with each other. The U.S. was the only nation capable of helping the reconstruction of Europe, and the only one which could provide a counterweight to the Soviet Union. In the same way,

the U.S. knew that it would obtain economic advantages from helping, and at the same time make sure that the Russians were contained.¹¹

Lundestad argues how both Britain and France had been practically ruined by the war when he explains the economic and political sides of “empire” by invitation. When offering economic assistance to European states, the American government also implied that governments free from any elements of Communism would be met with a more positive response than those which were “infected” with too much Socialism. As a result, the U.S. gave more to states which were politically compatible with its views and values, and those that were not were either blocked or received much smaller amounts. In addition to skepticism towards the far left, the U.S. was not too fond of the far right either. America promoted more centrist governments, and this actually gave Europeans leverage since the U.S. strongly disapproved of the alternatives. “The weaker they were, the more leverage they sometimes had”.¹² There is no doubt that the Europeans were very interested in the involvement of the United States in European affairs. In analyzing the military side of “empire” by invitation, Lundestad claims that most of the initiatives which led to the forming of NATO, came from Europe and not the U.S. “In the negotiations to set up NATO, virtually every European country wanted to make the American military commitment to Europe as automatic as possible.”¹³ Just as Europe wanted the Americans to be involved in economic affairs, this kind of commitment was also encouraged in military affairs. With the growing American commitment to NATO, there was a lesser willingness from Europe to do its part, and this was not in accordance with the American objective of making Europe increase its own defense efforts.¹⁴

There were several motives for the American support of European integration according to Lundestad. He labels the first one as “The American Model”, and this was the idea of American universalism. Many senators together with people in high position believed that Europe would benefit from adopting the American model and develop in the same way as the thirteen colonies had done in the past. In other words; the United States of Europe. A second motive was “A More Efficient Europe,” with “...Washington’s emphasis on an integrated Europe being a more rational and efficient Europe.”¹⁵ There is no doubt that the economic benefits of this were striking, but there

¹¹ Geir Lundestad, *Øst, Vest, Nord, Sør* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2000), 157 – 160.

¹² Lundestad 2003: 47.

¹³ Lundestad 2003: 52.

¹⁴ Lundestad, 2003: 27 – 53.

¹⁵ Lundestad 2003: 87.

would also be benefits politically as it would be easier for the U.S. to deal with one, united Western Europe. “A Reduced American Burden” meant that European integration would reduce American expenses. After all, the U.S. did not intend to pay for European security forever. It would be unwise to neglect the motive of “Containing the Soviet Union”. Washington’s faith in European integration as containment remained strong for more than forty years. Another aspect of this was there was a hope that a powerful united Western Europe would attract all Soviet satellite states in the East. Finally, Lundestad labels the last motive for European Integration as “Containment of Germany”. According to him, the fear of a united, powerful Germany arising was substantial among the Western powers, not just the U.S. To prevent an independent Germany from establishing ties with the Soviet Union, it was necessary to keep Germany divided and make sure that Western Germany formed the backbone of European integration together with France. This again meant actual “dual containment,” in trying to control Germany and prevent the Soviet Union from gaining influence.¹⁶

2.3 An Introduction to Regionalism

Bjørn Hettne explains a region by referring to three models. The first one is “a trading bloc or mega market which is a result from a breakup of the free trading regime.”¹⁷ The second one is “the geo-political division of the world into competing or aligned military-political power blocs.”¹⁸ The third model and the one Hettne is calling the “New regionalism,” is “a process of regionalization from below which is a result from internal transformations within emerging regions.”¹⁹ This “New Regionalism” differs from the old one in three important respects. The first one is that the “New Regionalism” is taking form in a multipolar world instead of a bipolar world. Secondly, is that this regionalism is created from within rather than from above as the old regionalism was. Thirdly, “the new regionalism is a more comprehensive, multidimensional process with less regard to objectives.”²⁰ This applies to the

¹⁶ Lundestad, 2003: 86 – 91.

¹⁷ Bjørn Hettne, “Global Market versus The New Regionalism,” in *The Global Transformations Reader: An Introduction to the Globalization Debate*, ed. David Held and Anthony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 360.

¹⁸ Hettne 2003: 360.

¹⁹ Hettne 2003: 360.

²⁰ Hettne 2003: 362.

development of the European Union, as it has over the years evolved by initiatives from within. In addition, the European Union is multipolar since it consists of many different countries where no one is above the others.

A distinction between normative and positive understanding of regionalism is also necessary according to Hettne. The normative meaning of regionalism is regional integration seen as a political project. The European Union is a political as well as an economic project, and therefore fits well into this distinction. In addition, there is a difference between hegemonic regionalism, which is created by pressure from a hegemonic power and autonomous regionalism, which is regionalism from below.²¹ Hegemonic regionalism does not apply to the European Union, but can be used when describing America's interest in connecting the countries of Latin America.

It is important for Hettne to distinguish between levels of regionness, which is regional complexity, when talking about regions' capacity as actors. There are five levels of regionness. The first is region as "a geographical and ecological unit, delimited by natural barriers."²² The second level is "region as a social system, something which implies translocal relations of social, political, cultural and economic nature between human groups."²³ The important thing here is that they constitute some form of regional complex. The third level is "region as organized cooperation in any of the cultural, economic or military fields."²⁴ Here, region is defined by membership of the regional organization in question. The fourth level is "region as regional civil society, which takes shape when the organizational framework promotes social communication and convergence of values throughout the region."²⁵ A key element at this level is the multidimensional quality of regional cooperation. The last level of regionness is "region as acting subject with a distinct identity, actor capability, legitimacy, and structure of decision-making."²⁶ Important areas here are conflict resolution and welfare. This level is emphasized in this thesis since the European Union is an example of this degree of regionness. "The ultimate outcome of this level of regionalism could be a "region-state," which in terms of scope can be compared to the classical empires, but in terms of

²¹ Hettne 2003: 360.

²² Hettne 2003: 360.

²³ Hettne 2003: 361.

²⁴ Hettne 2003: 361.

²⁵ Hettne 2003: 361.

²⁶ Hettne 2003: 361.

political order constitutes a voluntary evolution of sovereign national political units into a supranatural community to which certain functions are transferred.”²⁷

The European Union serves as the best example of regionalism we have, and many believe it will function as an example for the rest of the world to follow in establishing a world order of “region-states.” An interesting debate would be how the U.S. would respond to this kind of world wide regionalism. Would America support these regionalist projects, or resist since they could, and most likely, would represent a threat to American power and dominance?

Hettne explains the different dimensions of regionalization: “The process of regionalization implies a change from relative heterogeneity to increased homogeneity and in this context it important to note different dimensions of regionalization.”²⁸ These are culture, security, economic policies and political regime. Important for this thesis are security and economic policies. Security is a crucial dimension, and the divisions of security also mean the divisions of economy. This was very clearly shown in the pattern of regional economic cooperation in Europe during the Cold War. “A common security order is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, precondition for regional integration. Of equal importance is the compatibility of economic policies.”²⁹ Both of these dimensions were crucial for the relationship between Europe and American during the Cold War.

2.4 Robert Jervis: Defensive Realism

Roberts Jervis is arguing for defensive realism. He claims that this theory has more in common with neo-liberals in taking a position on the role of unnecessary conflict, where the prisoner’s dilemma analogy is important. A state which increases its own security can have negative effects on another state’s security. Furthermore, he continues by explaining how defensive realists are more pessimistic than neo-liberals. First of all, defensive realists believe that conflict is only necessary where there are aggressor states. Secondly, he argues that it can sometimes be hard for states to establish which situation they are in. For example, one state can mistake another for being aggressive when it is simply seeking security. Finally, defensive realists are not so confident in the actors’ abilities to achieve common interests or goals.

²⁷ Hettne 2003: 360 – 361.

²⁸ Hettne 2003: 362.

²⁹ Hettne 2003: 363.

Jervis claims that defensive realists fall between offensive realists and neo-liberals, and that in this view the actions of a state depends on whether it faces a likeminded partner or an aggressive, expansionist state. When discussing the changes needed for cooperation and reducing the danger of conflict, Jervis argues the following:

Thus for defensive realists, diagnosis of the situation and the other's objectives is a critical and difficult step, which explains why analysts of this type come to different policy prescriptions if they have different views of the adversary.³⁰

It all depends on the nature of the situation, whether the actors in focus are characterized as status quo powers or expansionist powers facing each other. Jervis also claims that "many conflicts can be seen as both an avoidable security dilemma and the product of irreconcilable differences."³¹

He also notes that this aspect of defensive realism can be applied to the relationship between America and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Both superpowers sought security for themselves, and their differences were so comprehensive in that each "believed that the other would be a menace as long as its domestic system was in place."³² Jervis' and his thoughts about defensive realism are indeed worth examining in this context.³³ Defensive realists' emphasis on the security dilemma and the intentions of the actors are both useful in order to explain American responses towards European integration, as this describes the situation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

2.5 Fareed Zakaria: State-centered Realism

"Nations try to expand their political interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power."³⁴ It is statesmen who confront the international system, not nations, and they have access to only a small part of the national power of which the state apparatus can extract for itself. State power is important to statesmen, not the capabilities of the nation. Furthermore, this is the ability

³⁰ Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neo-Liberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate," *International Security* 24, no. 1 (Summer, 1999), 52, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-2889%28199922%2924%3A1%3C42%3ARNACUT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6> (accessed January 26, 2007).

³¹ Jervis 1999: 53.

³² Jervis 1999: 53.

³³ Jervis 1999: 42 – 63.

³⁴ Fareed Zakaria, *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role* (Princeton University Press, 1999), 38.

of the state to extract power for its own ends. Statesmen will therefore expand the nation's political interests in other countries when they find an increase in state power, not national power.

According to Zakaria, state-centered realism is more sophisticated than classical realism when regarding the measurement of power. It tries to bring the state back into realism, and it limits itself in concentrating only on foreign policy, and does not include domestic policy. Zakaria argues that "state power is a function of national power and state strength,"³⁵ and this means that the stronger the state is, the more capable it is to use national power for its ends. This must however be measured along several axes, and these are state scope and a state's central policy-making apparatus. How broadly a state defines its responsibilities, as well how strong capabilities and cohesion a state has to carry out its intentions, are important issues in this context.³⁶

The main idea behind this theory is that when a state becomes more powerful, it will expand in order to maximize its influence and be able to control its international environment.³⁷ "In sum, this theory argues that a state's capabilities shape its intentions: it will expand when it can."³⁸

2.6 Hegemony Theory

World-system theorists explain hegemony as something more than just leadership, but also less than an empire. A more narrow definition states that the principal function of the hegemon in the twentieth century was to provide an international commercial and financial system based on liberal values.³⁹ After 1945, some have claimed that the U.S. is a hegemon. The theory of hegemony implies that the hegemon is above others, but does not obtain control by use of force. Its way of dominating is rather by encouraging others to adapt its norms in a process of

³⁵ Zakaria 1999: 38.

³⁶ Zakaria 1999: 35 – 43.

³⁷ Sean M. Lynn Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay", review of *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, by Fareed Zakaria, *International Security*, Vol. 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998), 157 – 182, <http://www.jstor.org/view/01622889/di008164/00p0071n/0?frame=noframe&userID=c19df88a@uio.no/01cc99332700501bafc14&dpi=3&config=jstor> (site accessed on 6 April 2007).

³⁸ Jones 1998: 161.

³⁹ Niall Ferguson, *Colossus. The Price of America's Empire* (Penguin Books, 2004), 9.

socialization.⁴⁰ The original theorist in the area of hegemony was Italian writer Antonio Gramsci, and the concept of ruling by means of culture domination instead of coercion or political domination, is the core of his hegemony theory.

Gramsci (1971) began with the insight that, most of the time, political power in liberal democracies is exercised not through government use of force (imprisoning political dissenters, killing protestors, etc.), but through a dominant world-view, or ideology. This commonly-held set of ideas and symbols legitimates existing rulers, helping them to win the citizens' consent, or at least acquiescence.⁴¹

Gramsci's translated writings contain no precise definition of cultural hegemony. What comes closest is his often quoted characterization of hegemony as "the spontaneous" consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is historically caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production.⁴²

A large part of this concept can be applied to the way in which America influenced Europe during the Cold War by offering economic aid and protection against Communism. The American notion of liberalism was carried onto Europe and adopted there, both economically and politically. Even though Europe was not that different from America in terms of culture, it still had to adapt to and embrace American values as "payment" for assistance.

Furthermore, in "Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci," Gramsci writes about "economism" and hegemony:

Undoubtedly, the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interest and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed – in

⁴⁰ Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, *U.S. Foreign Policy since 1945* (London\New York: Routledge, 2001), 65.

⁴¹ Dr. Chad Raphael, "Theory of Hegemony and Ideology", *Santa Clara University*, <http://codesign.scu.edu/chad/120/heg.html> (accessed January 26, 2007).

⁴² T. J. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities," *The American Historical Review*, Vol. 90, no. 3. (June 1985), p. 568, <http://www.jstor.org/view/00028762/di951441/95p00056/0?currentResult=00028762%2bdi951441%2b95p00056%2b0%2cFFFFFF0B&searchUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jstor.org%2Fsearch%2FBasicResults%3Fhp%3D25%26si%3D1%26Query%3Dcultural%2Bhegemony> (accessed January 26, 2007).

other words, that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind.⁴³

This can be applied to how the U.S. sacrificed certain economic interest when promoting European integration during the Cold War. This was as, mentioned earlier in this chapter, necessary in order to achieve the overall goal which was to integrate Europe as a mean to fight Communism.

In their article *Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order*, Thomas J. Volgy and Lawrence E. Imalle, argue that hegemony was also a structural feature of the Cold War in addition to bipolarity. These authors draw their conclusion on the traditions set by Gilpin, Thompson and Levi, which states “the world order of the recent past can be viewed as a function of strong leadership or hegemony exercised by a single powerful state.”⁴⁴ They continue by emphasizing that during a period of hegemony, one single actor emerges and has the capability of providing strong leadership in establishing the rules of the system, and in addition has economic and military capabilities which are strong enough to pose deterrence against other actors that could disrupt hegemonic leadership and the stability of the system.⁴⁵ According to the authors “hegemony occurs when a single central actor has the capability and willingness to lead the system and to create order and predictability in global politics.”⁴⁶ Clearly, this suits well to explain the position of the U.S. after the Second World War and to some extent during most of the period of the Cold War.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter has defined the theories which are used in this thesis. The next chapter performs an analysis of these theories, and tries to determine whether they can explain the historical events and political actions taken by the United States during the

⁴³ Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, edited and translated by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, (International Publishers, New York: 1971), 161.

⁴⁴ Thomas J Volgy and Lawrence E. Imwalle, “Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order,” *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 4 (November 1995), 823, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0092-5853%28199511%2939%3A4%3C819%3AHABPOT%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1> (accessed January 26, 2007).

⁴⁵ Volgy and Imwalle 1995: 819-834.

⁴⁶ Volgy and Imwalle 1995: 824.

period of the Cold War. Chapter four makes, as mentioned in the introductory chapter, an analysis of the theories' explanatory power during the period of the War on Terror.

Chapter 3: The Cold War

3.1 Introduction

This chapter deals with a central aspect of the relationship between the U.S. and Europe during the Cold War, namely America's strong interest in a European regionalist project. Was this positive attitude towards European integration born from a moral and sympathetic view of helping Europe get back on its feet, was it just meant to serve America's own interest both economically and militarily, or was it a result from a combination of these and other factors?

After inviting the Americans in for protection against Communism and help to rebuild itself, Europe developed into a significant power bloc itself which later started to move away from American control. Did the Americans foresee this change, and what was their response to the changing reality? Seemingly, the U.S. officially supported European integration all the way even though emphasis on US-Europe relations varied over the years. Fighting Communism in other parts of the world moved America's attention away from Europe as the Cold War progressed. Nevertheless, the notion that integration served the interests of both sides of the Atlantic always remained.

The main part of this chapter is an analysis of how well the theories from chapter 2 can explain events and actions taken by the U.S. concerning European integration. This analysis however, will be limited to the period from 1967 to 1977 due to the complexity and the length of the period of the Cold War. The reason for choosing this particular period is that during these years Europe started to emerge more on its own making this an interesting subject for analysis. In addition, during these years the U.S. had been weakened by the Vietnam War and thus tried to establish "special relationships" with Britain and France in order to gain more control over the development in Europe.

Furthermore, one section of this chapter deals with how the different administrations responded to regionalism in Europe during the period from 1945 to 1989. The intent of this short overview is to establish if there are patterns to be found in how presidents and their administrations responded to regionalism in Europe. Some administrations are covered more thoroughly than others in order to show the patterns more clearly. These are the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Reagan administrations.

A discussion of the role of NATO during the Cold War is also an important part of this chapter. The organization served first and foremost as a mean of containing Communism, but it also represented the glue which held America and Europe together. Finally, a conclusion sums up the analysis of each theory

3.2 Applying the Theories

3.2.1 “*Empire by Invitation*”

Lundestad’s theory of how Europeans accepted and welcomed American leadership at first can hardly be doubted. A Europe in crisis had no other option if it were to ensure its own survival. Also important were the close ties the region had with America after massive emigration from Europe to the U.S.: and the Allied together during the World Wars I and II. Seemingly, there was not much anti-Americanism at this point. However, Lundestad’s emphasis on “empire,” even if he is speaking of a limited “empire,” does not get attention in this thesis. Rather, the issue here is regarding the U.S. as a hegemon as explained in the section concerning hegemony theory. Lundestad defends his use of “empire” by referring to Zbigniew Brzezinski who explains “empire” as: “morally neutral to describe a hierarchical system of political relationships, radiating from a center.”⁴⁷ James McAllister argues that: “His definition of “empire” is less than clear and many scholars will question exactly how much this “empire” differs from what other scholars have described as an American hegemony or sphere of influence.”⁴⁸ As a result, this chapter chooses to use the concept of hegemony when analyzing American responses. When discussing America as an empire, one can wonder why the U.S. pushed so hard for European integration and European sovereignty, since this would be a future challenge for the world’s most powerful state.⁴⁹ An empire would surely not do such a thing? Lundestad admits that the U.S. willingly sacrificed control in exchange for achieving other important goals, but this thesis still argues that the label of “empire” should be replaced with “hegemon.”

⁴⁷ Lundestad 2003: 1.

⁴⁸ James McAllister, “Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997”, review of *Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration 1945-1997*, by Geir Lundestad, *Political Science Quarterly* 113, no. 4 (Winter, 1998), 705, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195%28199824%2F199924%29113%3A4%3C705%3A%22BITUS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-I> (accessed June 5, 2006).

⁴⁹ McAllister, 1998: 706.

America had the military and economic power to help Europe, but also to set the rules for this region. It seemed that help always came with certain requirements, as the U.S. had plans of restructuring Europe. According to Lundestad, the relationship turned sour when Europe started to feel secure enough to state its own interests again. He argues that in the period between 1969 and 1977, “.....Europe was striking out more on its own.”⁵⁰ Both France and Germany were in these years developing their own policies to deal with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Another factor which strengthened Europe was the membership of Britain in the European Community. In addition, there was a rise of democracy in Southern Europe. The U.S. under Nixon had redefined itself in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. The administration acknowledged the decline of the U.S. and now sought to cooperate with other major economic centers in the World. However, even though Europe wanted to appear more as an independent actor, the invitations to the U.S. still continued. According to Lundestad, the military dependency on American endured and it was of utter most importance to keep American soldiers in Western Europe. In addition, he argues that Western Europe did not want to become an equal to the U.S. at all neither did it expect to be. Even so, the tensions were many, and they were more of a structural kind than before. The objects of disagreement were no longer single issues but touched basic relationships instead.⁵¹

However, despite all the tensions that arose, American presence in Europe was still encouraged and practically demanded by Europeans. They were not that secure yet. Some scholars disagree with his claim that containing Germany was a more important factor behind European integration than containing the Soviet Union, but this thesis argues that this emphasis is important. The fear of Germany rising once again was indeed very clear in the early years after the war (this fear actually remained for several decades), and it seems probable that dual containment functioned as a strong incentive for European integration both by America and the nations of Western Europe. As McAllister argues:

While America’s support for European integration was rooted in many different factors, Lundestad correctly emphasizes that the critical factor driving Washington’s policies was the need to resolve the classical German problem in a way that both the Germans and the Western Europeans could voluntarily accept.⁵²

⁵⁰ Lundestad 2003: 168.

⁵¹ Lundestad 2003: 168 – 169.

⁵² McAllister 1998: 705.

Solving the German problem was a prerequisite for European integration, and thus in the interest of both the U.S. and the nations of Europe. In addition, European integration was a way of removing the threat of a united Germany rising once again as an enemy.

3.2.2 “The New Regionalism”

Regionalism, or more specifically Bjørn Hettne’s concept of “new regionalism,” is very useful in order to explain how the European Union has evolved over the years. In the early years after World War II one could talk about the U.S. as a hegemon presiding over Europe. The economic and military aspects of this form of hegemony will be covered in the section dealing with hegemony theory. Hettne’s emphasis on how Europe began to evolve from within is what makes his theory important for the argument of this thesis. The motivation behind European integration changed from being encouraged from the outside (from the U.S.), he claims, to initiatives which started to come from within. The process acquired a life of its own, and integration moved in a direction which served the interests of European nations instead of those of U.S. However, this thesis is limited to a specific period of the Cold War, and will not proceed into the matter of the reunification of Germany and how this effected European integration and the strengthening of this region.

As previously mentioned, during the period from 1969 to 1977, Europe started to strike out more on its own. The integration process was strengthened by the admission of new members in 1973. Britain was one of them, and this contributed strongly to strengthening regionalism in Western Europe. It is interesting to note what Geir Lundestad wrote about Great Britain in this context: “The paradox was now, when the United States finally took a strong interest in the ‘special relationship’, Britain was not really interested.”⁵³ Britain under Prime Minister Heath was at this time more interested in British membership in the European Community. The relationship between the Nixon-Kissinger administration and France was at this point very important. France, under de Gaulle and Pompidou was skeptical towards European integration in the sense that it preferred a loose confederal structure. American initiatives towards a supranational Europe could disrupt relation between the U.S. and France. Washington then decided to keep a lower profile on supporting regionalism in Europe in order to improve relations.

⁵³ Lundestad 2003: 181.

However, this did not prevent the relationship between the two from reaching an all time low; the differences were many and complex. Furthermore, the European independence can be overstated; Europe was as dependent on America as it had been before. The American security guarantee was as important as ever, and during this period the U.S. demanded that Europe should take its share of the burden. On the other hand, American did make concessions. For example, the U.S. recognized that French and British nuclear forces were able to pose as deterrents on their own. Washington had tried for long to make these two countries give up their independent deterrence, in order to make Europe more dependent on American and thus have stronger control over the development in Western Europe.⁵⁴ These examples serve to show how a weakened U.S. responded to a strengthened Europe, by trying to establish “special relationships” in order to preserve American interests. Also, the U.S. had to make certain concessions in order to preserve Atlantic relations. In addition, this example shows how Europe, more specifically the EC, was emerging as a potential power bloc.

“The New Regionalism” is actually intended to provide an explanation for the process of European integration after the end of the Cold War, where the context moved from bipolarity to multipolarity. It was after this period that stronger initiatives came from within than from the outside. As mentioned in chapter two, the old regionalism was specific with regards to objectives while the new process of regionalism takes into account a greater diversity of dimensions and is more comprehensive. However, this thesis still argues the relevance of this theory in explaining the process of integration in Europe during the Cold War.

The seeds that were sown in this period are what laid the foundations for Hettne’s theory, and the argument for this thesis on how the process of integration in Europe gained independence from American influence. This did happen slowly during the Cold War, especially during the period from 1969 to 1977 as described in the previous paragraph, but even more in the years after the fall of the Soviet Union. There are many critics of regionalism who believe that too much emphasis is put into regions and their development, and that one should instead concentrate on analysis on a larger scale. However, one should not underestimate the power of regionalism, and the impact it has had on the relationship between Europe and the United States, not to mention the impact

⁵⁴ Lundestad 2003: 181 – 183.

on Europe itself. What remains to be seen, is if there will be similar successful regionalist projects in other places in the world, and how America will respond to these.

One weakness of Hettne's theory can be that it only applies to the European Union as a regionalist project. However, this has no consequence for the argument in this thesis.

3.2.3 "Defensive Realism"

This thesis argues that defensive realism as described by Robert Jervis is useful in explaining American foreign policy during the Cold War, despite several critiques of the theory. The basic point of this theory is that states expand because they seek security. One of the theory's critics is Farheed Zakaria. He does not see defensive realism as a complete theory and he argues that the theory's emphasis on how a state expands due to insecurity and not from increased power is insufficient. In contrast to classical realism, where states expand when their power increases, defensive realism argues that fear is a factor which prompts the state to increase its influence. Zakaria then argues heavily that both of these theories have many flaws when one uses them to explain foreign policy, and therefore presents his own theory called state-centered realism.⁵⁵ One of his arguments is that defensive realism's emphasis on threats and security is insufficient. According to him, these elements are easy to form into fitting arguments that explain policy. For example, decision makers can use preservation of national security as a reason to expand. Even so, Zakaria realizes that the link between threats and expansion does exist in international politics, and that it is useful to test this.⁵⁶

However, despite Zakaria's criticism of the theory, this thesis argues that defensive realism is useful in explaining American foreign policy towards Europe in the case of containing Communism. There was a great deal of fear about the threat of Communism's expansion in the U.S. at this time, which came close to mass hysteria, and there can be no doubt that this fear helped to form policy. If Europe fell to Communism, it would soon spread to the rest of the world, including America. Thus, containing the Soviet Union by means of European regionalism was necessary for U.S.

⁵⁵ Zakaria 1999: 21 – 22.

⁵⁶ Zakaria 1999: 42.

security, and in this context it is clear that defensive realism serves well as an explanation of American responses to European integration during the Cold War.

It is important to note though, that this fear was perhaps not as strong in the period from 1969 to 1977 as it was in the 1950s. Despite this fact, concern about Soviet expansion was strong in the U.S. during these years. Furthermore, when taking into account the fact that the U.S. had been weakened by the failure in the Vietnam War, it was clear that Europe was again important as deterrent against the Soviet Union. As mentioned in the previous section, the U.S. made concessions in order to preserve a good relationship with Europe. This again shows how important Europe was for the security of the U.S. during the Cold War, and then especially during the years from 1969 to 1977 where the U.S. had been weakened from having waged a destructive war in Asia. Even though the Soviet threat was declining, the Nixon administration was concerned about the policy of “*ostpolitik*”. The administration feared that the Soviet Union might try and persuade the West Germans to abandon their strong ties to NATO and the West.⁵⁷

In addition, Jervis’ point on whether a state faces an aggressor state or not is important. The Soviet Union was regarded by the U.S. as an aggressor state, and this would explain why the America acted as it did. Furthermore, as mentioned in chapter 2, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought security for themselves and their major differences made them fear each other. The only way to save one’s own ideology and way of life was to remove the other; they were both a threat to each other. The integration of Europe was an important part of this goal; it contributed to the security of the U.S. and helped to export its values and ideology.

3.2.4 “State-centered Realism”

Critics may say that this theory’s emphasis, which is solely on foreign policy, is a weakness. There are many who are of the opinion that domestic and foreign policy often are the same. The author of this thesis is of the opinion that these two spheres of policymaking must be separated in order to better analyze them both. Thus “state-centered realism” is therefore an important part of explaining American foreign policy together with “defensive realism.” Zakaria criticizes defensive realism, and uses this to strengthen his own theory. He argues that defensive realism’s focus on threats and

⁵⁷ Lundestad 2003: 172.

security, as well as its statement that states act according to the degree of threats they perceive, is not convincing and needs to be developed further. His own argument is that states expand when decision-makers experience an increase in state power. However, one can argue that this does not explain states which are satisfied with the status quo, and which are only interesting in maintaining security.⁵⁸ This is where the author of this thesis finds it useful to combine the two theories instead of arguing that one is better than the other. Zakaria uses his theory to explain American foreign policy between 1865 and 1908. This thesis proceeds beyond this, by testing whether this theory can also apply to American foreign policy towards European integration during the Cold War.

“State-centered realism” is especially relevant when it comes to America’s position after World War II, when it was one of the two superpowers dominating the world. Hence, the U.S. tried to expand its interests and influence in Europe by taking advantage of its position after World War II. America did this by promoting European regionalism, because it knew that the integration of Europe would serve American interests. Furthermore, since the power of the U.S. was at its peak, its potential of influencing the restoration and integration of Europe was indeed great.

When applying this theory on the period from 1969 to 1977, however, its explanatory power decreases heavily. As already mentioned in the two sections above, the U.S. had experienced a considerable blow after the Vietnam War. This made America appear much weaker than it had been at the end of World War II. Despite this fact, it can not be any doubts that the U.S. was still one of the two superpowers in the world and had not lost its influence over, or importance to, the nations of Western Europe. Furthermore, as one of the two superpowers, America did use the ability as such a power to expand its influence in Europe. The promotion of regionalism in Western Europe would not have been possible if the U.S. had not possessed the power it did. However, the decline of the U.S. after the Vietnam War does weaken the explanatory power of “state-centered realism” for describing American foreign policy, and more specifically American responses to European integration during the period from 1969 to 1977.

⁵⁸ Randal Schweller, “From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role”, review of *From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role*, by Fareed Zakaria, *The American Political Science Review* 93, no 2 (Jun., 1999), pp. 497-499, <http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0003-0554%28199906%2993%3A2%3C497%3AFWTPTU%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S> (accessed January 26, 2007).

3.2.5 “Hegemony Theory”

Hegemony theory, and then especially the article by Volgy and Imwalle, “Hegemonic and Bipolar Perspectives on the New World Order,” further serves to explain the position of the United States during the Cold War. As mentioned, they argue that hegemony was a structural feature of the Cold War as well as bipolarity. These authors’ emphasis on hegemony in the international system after the end of World War II has much relevance for America’s influence over the process of integration in Europe. Furthermore, the American influence on Europe which resulted from providing economic assistance and military deterrent against Communistic aggression, moreover, is congruent with this theory. Thus, the U.S. with its economic and military strength presided over Europe as a hegemon obtaining control by providing economic assistance to a devastated Europe, and protecting it militarily from the Soviet Union. This thesis understands control in the sense that the U.S. obtained most of its overall goals by supporting and advocating European integration, and as such became the hegemon. It can be argued however, that this hegemony was not entirely stable. After the early years of European invitations, tensions started to grow between the two sides of the Atlantic, and the extent to which the nations of Europe accepted American leadership on all international issues can be debated. The fact still remains that America was a hegemon in the sense of cultural domination by its import of liberal values economically and politically to Europe. In addition, its presence was both wanted and welcomed by almost every nation in Europe.

The U.S. had been severely weakened by the Vietnam War, but this did not change the fact that it still possessed the power and the role as a hegemon, even in the period from 1969 to 1977. Despite having to make concessions to Europe in order to preserve a balance in transatlantic relations, and then especially with France, America was still the actor who guaranteed the security of the nations of Western Europe. The European Community had in this period gone from being six members to nine including Great Britain. With Europe concentrating on integration instead of “special relationships,” the U.S. had to acknowledge that both France and Britain had, as previously mentioned, nuclear arsenals capable of posing as deterrents on their own. Thus, the U.S. was still a hegemon presiding over Western Europe, but it was a weakened hegemon, which faced an emerging Europe in a process of integration that started moving towards greater independence for itself.

Antonio Gramsci's thoughts about how liberal democracies exercise their political power through a dominant world view instead of use of force or coercion is well suited to characterize America's influence on Europe during the Cold War. The U.S. did not need to force its values or ideology on to Europe, these were both accepted willingly. However, this acceptance was in a way the price-tag which was attached to receiving the aid which was needed. Furthermore, it must be said that the differences in ideology were not that comprehensive between the two sides of the Atlantic, and therefore the differences that existed were easier to negotiate. When Gramsci wrote about "economism" and hegemony, there appears a clear connection with US-Europe relations during the Cold War. He argued that the hegemon needs to make certain economic sacrifices to address the interest of those it would "dominate." In this context, as mentioned earlier, America made several economic concessions in order to please the European nations. This was necessary for achieving the overall goal, which of course was European integration. Even though there were massive protests in the U.S. from business corporations who felt that their interests (mostly gaining entrance to the European market) were not emphasized, America did make integration a higher priority. If America was in decline, then it might make sense to become more skeptical of a highly integrated rival in Europe, but it certainly made no sense to antagonize its allies; America was becoming more, not less, dependent on the latter and had to act accordingly. Concessions had to be made, and Western Europe and Japan obviously came first among America's allies.⁵⁹

In the period from 1969 to 1977, even though the U.S. was weakened, the cultural impact of American remained in Western Europe:

On the cultural side it seemed that an American-dominated mass culture was making the United States and Western Europe more and more alike. We saw the same movies and later even many of the same television programs, read many of the same books, wore many of the same clothes, and even began to eat much of the same food.⁶⁰

Citizens in America and Western Europe saw many of the same movies since the movie industry in the U.S. was greatly expanding into the leading industry in the world in this area. These films were of course exported to Europe, where the American way of

⁵⁹ Lundestad 2003: 193.

⁶⁰ Geir Lundestad, *The United States and Europe: Past, Present and Future*, Lecture at the Norwegian Nobel Institute, 5 February, 2007, 2.

life portrayed intrigued the people of Western Europe. In addition, the export of food, literature and clothing also contributed to the melting together of the two sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, another important feature of this period which did also affect Western Europe to a certain extent, was the export of the Hippie movement, the youth rebellion and the music during this era in the late 1960s and early 1970s. All of these examples help to underline the importance and the major impact of American culture on Western Europe, even though the U.S. had diminished as a hegemon over Western Europe.

3.3 The Role of NATO during the Cold War (1945 - 1989)

Relations between North American and European members of the Alliance are the bedrock of NATO. These countries share the same essential values and interests and are committed to the maintenance of democratic principles, making the security of Europe and that of North America indivisible.⁶¹

When NATO was founded after the Second World War, it was very important for Europe to make sure that American commitments to the organization were deep. “In the negotiations to set up NATO, virtually every European country wanted to make the American commitment to Europe as automatic as possible.”⁶² The European emphasis on an integrated NATO force led by an American general suggested that American leadership was indeed welcome. In order to fight Communism, Western Europe had to be fitted into an Atlantic framework, and integral to this was NATO. The U.S., in addition, wanted to integrate Western Germany into NATO in order to strengthen the defense of Europe.⁶³

Under both the Eisenhower and the Kennedy administrations, there were references to an integrated Europe functioning as a “third force.”

Most of these references simply meant that a united Europe would be a third important actor in international politics, after the United States and the Soviet Union. There was rarely any implication that Europe would be an independent unit standing in the middle between the two existing superpowers; it was just an

⁶¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization Homepage, “The NATO handbook”, <http://www.nato.int/issues/faq/index.html#C1> (site accessed 2 April 2007).

⁶² Lundestad 2003: 52.

⁶³ Lundestad, 2003: 52 – 63.

additional one, and the expectation was almost always that it would be standing rather close to the United States.⁶⁴

The expression was much more often used in the Eisenhower administration than by the Kennedy administration, which in fact rarely made use of it. The emphasis in the latter was on the “Atlantic framework” and it was made clear that Europe had to behave. The reason for the Kennedy administration’s strict approach to European behavior was France’s Charles de Gaulle. He was the representative of the idea of an independent Europe functioning as a third force, and Washington would not support his kind of third force.”⁶⁵

This shows that European integration after Eisenhower did not necessarily mean total European independence. In other words, Europe should be independent in a way that suited the U.S. The American emphasis on the Atlantic framework and the incorporation of Western Germany into this was followed by a concern that Germany might in the end control European integration by virtue of being the strongest member nation. “The United States was obviously opposed to the integration of Europe if this took place under the leadership of a hostile power.”⁶⁶ Even though the integration of Europe and membership in NATO were both under American control, it would seem that the U.S. did not foresee the future role of the EU in international politics and the post-Cold War development of NATO. There was apparently enough fear of the negative potential of European integration to make sure that the processes did not take on a life of their own, outside American control. The discussion of the role of NATO during the War on Terror and the current position of the EU in international politics are taken up in chapter 4, and offer sharp contrasts to the realities of the Cold War.

3.4 American Presidents and their Responses to European Integration

3.4.1 Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman

Even though the American policies towards European regionalism have more or less remained the same during the Cold War - that is, the overall goal has always been the same - different presidents ranging from Roosevelt to Reagan, have not had the

⁶⁴ Lundestad 2003: 86.

⁶⁵ Lundestad, 2003: 86.

⁶⁶ Lundestad 2003: 77.

same view on how to deal with Europe. Some have been more skeptical than others to European integration, or its extent or how much emphasis should be put on transatlantic relations.

The Roosevelt administration was actually quite skeptical towards European integration immediately after the war. It feared that this could lead to “independent spheres of political influence and economic autarchy.”⁶⁷ In addition, the fear that Germany would dominate an integrated Europe was already present in the wartime administration. This later changed with the onset of Marshall Aid, during which where the U.S. fully supported European integration. President Truman supported integration, but was disappointed by the lack of leadership in Europe.⁶⁸

3.4.2 Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy

It is interesting to note the term “third force” again. As mentioned in the previous section, references to Europe as a “third force” can be found during the Eisenhower administration. This term meant that Europe could represent a third actor in international politics, together with the U.S. and the Soviet Union. However, the idea was that Europe would stand close to America, and not be completely independent, while Kennedy was president on the other hand, the term was hardly ever used. Apparently, the idea of Europe as a “third force” caused concern in the Kennedy administration since de Gaulle was in charge of France and had visions of an independent Europe which did not coincide with the plans of the American administration.⁶⁹ It seems clear that in addition to executive support for regionalism in Europe during these years, there was also a fear of Europe becoming too independent and powerful enough to state its own interests. This would not be a problem as long as these interests overlapped with those of America. However, President Kennedy openly supported European integration when he gave a speech at Independence Hall in 1962. He compared the uniting of Western Europe with the uniting of the first thirteen colonies of British North America:

The United States looks on this vast new enterprise with hope and admiration. We do not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival but as a partner. To aid its progress has been the basic object of our foreign policy for 17 years. We believe

⁶⁷ Lundestad 2003: 38.

⁶⁸ Lundestad 2003: 38.

⁶⁹ Lundestad 2003: 86.

that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defense, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of commerce, commodities, and currency, and developing coordinated policies in all economic, political, and diplomatic areas. We see in such a Europe a partner with whom we can deal on a basis of full equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of building and defending a community of free nations.⁷⁰

The emphasis in this speech was the strong American support for European regionalism and the importance of transatlantic cooperation. What is interesting is how President Kennedy specified that Europe was to be a partner and not a rival. He also expressed how the U.S. regarded Europe as a partner to deal with on the basis of full equality, and in this context it is worth considering the extent of this. This speech suggested that Europe should play a greater role in the common defense, something which could be interpreted that the nations of Europe should start paying some of their own bills. In addition, President Kennedy stressed the need to lowering trade barriers, which was an area of dispute between the two sides of the Atlantic. It would seem that Europe had to adjust to American views and values for it to be an equal partner, and still the degree equality could be debated. The criteria had to be that Europe remained close to the U.S. and did not oppose U.S. policies.

3.4.3 Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon

Both the Johnson and the Nixon administrations were not pleased with the fact that Europe did not support America's fight against Communism in Asia.⁷¹ This was yet another point in the continuing pattern of mutual disappointment the two experienced with each other. Europe did not understand why America put so much effort into fighting a war in Asia, a war opposed by most of Europe's citizens. America on the other hand, did not understand why Europe did not support its war against Communism in Asia. Communism was after all a threat to democracy everywhere in the world. Even so, both these U.S. administrations supported European integration. In the 1960s

⁷⁰ John F. Kennedy, "Address at Independence Hall", Philadelphia, July 4, 1962, (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum), <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/Speeches/JFK/003POF03IndependenceHall07041962.htm> (accessed January 27, 2007).

⁷¹ Lundestad 2003: 15.

however, more emphasis was put on making sure American economic interests were protected.⁷²

President Johnson's annual message to Congress on the state of the union in 1964 reaffirmed U.S. support for European integration:

In the Atlantic community we continue to pursue our goal of 20 years--a Europe that is growing in strength, unity, and cooperation with America. A great unfinished task is the reunification of Germany through self-determination. This European policy is not based on any abstract design. It is based on the realities of common interests and common values, common dangers and common expectations. These realities will continue to have their way--especially, I think, in our expanding trade and especially in our common defense. Free Americans have shaped the policies of the United States. And because we know these realities, those policies have been, and will be, in the interest of Europe. Free Europeans must shape the course of Europe. And, for the same reasons, that course has been, and will be, in our interest and in the interest of freedom.⁷³

In this speech, Johnson emphasized the common values and interests that Europe and America shared. Freedom was and is the foundation of any democracy, as well as self-determination. President Johnson repeated the words of President Kennedy when he emphasized cooperation and the expansion of trade and common defense. However, in this speech it is clear that the Johnson administration acknowledged European interests more than the Kennedy administration did. European integration was good for both the U.S. and the nations of Europe, both politically and economically.

During the presidency of Richard Nixon, the emphasis fell on the "Atlantic framework" for integration in Europe; that is emphasis on NATO as the most important security organization in Europe. The U.S. played the ball over to the Europeans: "Washington was no longer to push for the most supranational forms of European integration."⁷⁴ Europe had to decide for itself what it wanted. The American emphasis then shifted over to the "Atlantic framework," and not the process of integration of Europe. Growing skepticism towards the consequences of a Europe becoming too strong was beginning to show. Under Nixon there was the Year of Europe, which was an attempt to strengthen the transatlantic relationship within the "Atlantic framework."

⁷² Lundestad 2003: 176.

⁷³ Lyndon B. Johnson, "Annual Message to Congress on the State of the Union", January 4, 1965, (Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum), <http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/speeches.hom/650104.asp> (accessed January 27, 2007).

⁷⁴ Lundestad 2003: 176.

It can not be said to have been successful, especially when it came to the relationship between America and France. Important in this context however, is the pointing out of how the U.S. had global responsibilities while Europe only had regional ones, something which did not sit well with Europeans. Especially France, with de Gaulle and his predecessor Pompidou, did not agree with the Nixon administration's proposal of military burden-sharing. In addition, Nixon made a linkage between the American security guarantee and European concession in the economic sphere which did not appeal to the EC.⁷⁵

It is interesting to note what President Nixon wrote in "United States Foreign policy for the 1970s – Relating National Interests: The Challenge of European Unity."

Our friends must soon decide, then, how they see Europe's role in the world and its relationship with us. The form and degree of its unity is for Europeans to settle. The United States has always supported the strengthening and enlargement of the European Community. We still do. We welcome cohesion in Europe because it makes Europe a sturdier pillar of the structure of peace. Regional cohesion contributes to world stability. And America's and Western Europe's fundamental interests are parallel in most areas of policy. For years, however, it was believed uncritically that a unified Western Europe would automatically lift burdens from the shoulders of the United States. The truth is not so simple. European unity will also pose problems for American policy, which it would be idle to ignore.⁷⁶

In this speech it is clear that the notion of European integration no longer was merely a positive one for America. First, Nixon made it clear that Europe needed to decide what its role in the world would be, and more importantly, what form its relationship to the U.S. should take. This could be seen as a sign of the U.S. growing weary of European opposition to its plans for the integration in Europe. Because of the weakened position of the U.S. due to the Vietnam War cooperation was encouraged, and this worked well regarding security but not on economic issues. "Europeans could not have it both ways."⁷⁷ If they wanted the American security guarantee, they needed to make economic concessions on their part. Finally, Nixon admits that integration could pose problems to the U.S. Regionalism in Europe had moved from being a mean of containing Communism and serving America's interests to actually becoming a challenge for America. Challenges meant mostly economic disputes since the US

⁷⁵ Lundestad 2003: 175 - 185.

⁷⁶ Richard M. Nixon, "U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s, Report to the Congress", February 18, 1970, (From Revolution to Reconstruction and what happened afterwards), http://odur.let.rug.nl/~usa/P/rn37/writings/ch3_p1.htm (accessed January 26, 2007).

⁷⁷ Lundestad 2003: 180.

economy was experiencing problems and there was a need for Europe to start lowering trade tariffs and reduce protectionism in the agricultural sphere.

3.4.4 Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan

As a contrast to the Nixon administration's focus on leaving European integration to the Europeans, the Carter administration had a more positive attitude to the European Community. President Carter even criticized the former administration for putting too little emphasis on the relationship with Europe. However, the years under Carter were characterized by few conflicts in the economic sphere and his administration did not spend much time with EC questions. In addition, there was not much development inside the EC itself either, resulting in little activity regarding transatlantic relations.⁷⁸ As a result of this, this thesis does not analyze the Carter administration's response to regionalism in Europe any further.

When Ronald Reagan assumed the Presidency, he started by taking a hard line against the Soviet Union. There was a great emphasis on deterring Communism in Europe by showing military power, especially nuclear power. The incentive to encourage Europe to increase its conventional forces disappeared. Furthermore, what also vanished was the need to consult Europe on matters of relations with the Soviet Union, something which troubled America's ally. Even though Reagan in his second term had a change of heart and embraced cooperation with the Soviet Union, this did not completely remove the problems between the U.S. and Europe. In the mid 1980s there was also a shift away from containment to the "rollback" of Communism. The "Reagan Doctrine" was the strategy of tunneling weapons and financial support to third world countries in order to support anti-Communist resistance movements. The success of this doctrine was clear in the last years of the Reagan administration and "These successes also improved American-European relations and strengthened Washington's position in Europe."⁷⁹ Despite this, a reaction came in Washington concerning the idea of a "Fortress Europe" in the economic sphere. European markets exclusively for Europeans did not serve America's interests.⁸⁰

In his statement on the 25th anniversary of the European Community however, President Reagan appeared positive to European integration:

⁷⁸ Lundestad 2003: 202 - 203.

⁷⁹ Lundestad 2003: 230.

⁸⁰ Lundestad 2003: 210 - 232.

Let me reaffirm clearly the support of this administration for European unity. We consider a strong and united Europe not a rival, but a partner. As we enter the second quarter century of relations between the European Community and the United States, we face economic and political challenges as difficult as those which confronted our predecessors in 1957. However, the relationship between Western Europe and the United States has changed fundamentally. In those days the United States was the dominant partner, and Europe had a more dependent role. Now the economic weight of the two sides is more evenly balanced.⁸¹

In this speech, President Reagan acknowledged the economic growth of the European Community and repeated the words of President Kennedy: Europe was and would always be a partner and not a rival. This part of the speech does not seem to have any elements of fear of a “Fortress Europe”, or suggestions of limiting European influence. The last part of this statement, however, proceeds as follows:

Both Europe and the United States recognize that partnership involves responsibilities. These responsibilities apply to the economic area in particular where we both have the responsibility to avoid actions which have an adverse impact on our trading partners and to preserve our free trading system. They also extend to our common security interests, where we have the responsibility to cooperate on support for like-minded countries seeking closer Western ties, and to resist the efforts of those who do not share our values to extend their power and influence. The European Community, as well as the United States, will provide responsible leadership in these areas in the years ahead.⁸²

The emphasis on “responsibilities” and trade might suggest that there was a concern about European protectionism. This was a pattern which had a long tradition in the relationship between Europe and America. In addition, there were to be responsibilities concerning security interests. Especially the part emphasizing the support of “like-minded countries” can perhaps be seen as a justification of the Reagan Doctrine to promote democracy over Communism. The last part where Reagan states that Europe as well as the U.S. would exercise leadership in the years ahead seems to have other implications. The fact remained that the U.S. would always have the last word, and America remained the sole leader despite great words about “shared responsibility” and “shared leadership.”

⁸¹ Ronald Reagan, “Statement on the 25th Anniversary of the European Union”, March 24, 1982, (Ronald Reagan Presidential Library), http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/search/speeches/speech_srch.html (accessed January 27, 2007).

⁸² Reagan 1982.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter attempts, through a critical evaluation of the theories presented, to establish the reasons for America's initial positive response towards European integration. Furthermore, the evaluation also explains how the relationship between the U.S. and Europe changed, especially after the 1960s where America grew disappointed of the development in Europe. Finally, this chapter highlights how hegemony was an important factor in the relationship between Europe and America during the Cold War.

Geir Lundestad's theory of "Empire by Invitation" shows how Europe welcomed American leadership at first, but only to resist later when European interests did not coincide with those of the U.S. As mentioned earlier, the need for American economic and military support was great. After receiving support, Europe started to question American leadership, but still continued to welcome American presence in Europe. The tensions between the two sides of the Atlantic started to shift from good to bad whenever issues of disagreements appeared. Even though the U.S. achieved most of its goals by supporting integration, the end result did not seem to be exactly as planned. America did not foresee the resistance which arose in the nations of Europe, as it believed that their interests coincided, which they mostly did, but not in all areas. The crucial points here are the enormous power that the U.S. possessed after the war, the European dependency on American aid, and the tensions which arose whenever the two parties experienced a conflict of interests. The weakening of the U.S. during the period from 1969 to 1977 did have an effect on the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic. When Britain became a member of the European Community, London resisted the forming of a "special relationship" with the U.S. and instead concentrated on European integration together with France and Germany. However, the need for the American security guarantee remained as Europe strongly encouraged the presence of American troops in Western Europe.

The theory of regionalism as presented by Bjørn Hettne shows how the European regionalist project got a life of its own. Hettne's "New regionalism" theory describes how the initiatives began to come from within Europe. Also, the negative sides of regionalism, like the idea of a "Fortress Europe," are clearly present when regarding the American frustration with the agriculture policies of Europe. "New Regionalism" serves to explain how an American sponsored European integration with the goal of obtaining U.S. interests evolved into something more. This regionalism changed Europe into an

economic and political community, or more specifically an autonomous power bloc which gained independence from America. However, despite this independence and self-awareness, Europe remained deeply connected to the U.S. throughout the Cold War because of the continued need for economic aid and military protection from Communism. An important point is that with growing European integration came a growing demand to have a stronger voice, especially in matters concerning Europe. Especially during the years from 1969 to 1977, the process of European integration accelerated with the admission of Britain in 1973. The initiatives from within became stronger as France, and now also Britain, concentrated on the development of the European Community instead of a “special relationship” with the U.S.

Robert Jervis’ notions of defensive realism can also help to explain American foreign policy during the Cold War. Defensive realism puts emphasis on how states expand because of fear, and this can also be applied to the situation of the U.S. after the war. The fear of a competing, aggressive ideology posed by the Soviet Union can be seen as a motivating factor in American support for European integration. Especially important is the security dilemma, where the increased security of one state can have a negative effect on another. In this context we need to bear in mind the arms race which started between the Soviet Union and the U.S.

Fareed Zakaria’s theory of state-centered realism can be useful in explaining how the U.S. responded to regionalism in Europe during the years of the Cold War. As state-centered realism claims, nations will make an attempt to increase their influence when decision-makers experience an increase in state power. This is what happened after World War II, when the U.S. was one of the two superpowers of the world. The American means for increasing influence were to support and advocate European integration. Firstly, European integration served as a way of achieving important goals and strengthening the U.S. against the Soviet Union. Secondly, it was a mean for extending American values and way of life across the Atlantic. However, the fact that the U.S. found itself weakened in the period from 1967 to 1977, as a result of the war in Vietnam, makes this theory less relevant. In the context of being a superpower, it seems likely that this could be a reason why the U.S. tried to expand its influence over the development in Western Europe.

The influence of hegemony on Euro-American relations during the Cold War, as described by Volgy and Imwalle, explains how America became a hegemon when encouraging and supporting regionalism in Europe. As mentioned, this was not

hegemony by force, but more in a sense of cultural domination. This is one of the aspects of Antonio Gramsci's theory, namely that the hegemon relies on values instead of power as means of "ruling." The cultural impact of America on the nations of Western Europe is an important point. The export of American movies, clothing, literature, music and food heavily influenced Western Europe, and contributed to making the two sides of the Atlantic more alike. America had the economic and military power to set the rules of the game after being invited by the Europeans. In exchange for receiving aid and protection, they had to embrace the American system of liberal values in economy and politics. In addition, the Gramsci's thoughts about "economism" and how the hegemon needs to make sacrifices in order to achieve and sustain its hegemony, are important when considering the Cold War. America did sacrifice certain economic interests, but this was necessary for the further development of the integration of Europe. Following the argument of Volgy and Imwalle, it is clear that the U.S. as the hegemon presided over Europe and had the strength and ability to prevent Communism from disrupting its hegemony during the Cold War.

The role of NATO during the Cold War is underlined by its importance to both Europe and the U.S. The organization was necessary for the integration of Europe and as a collective military defense against the Soviet Union. The American domination of NATO was welcomed by Europeans, who preferred to dwell safely under the wings of the superpower. America had no problem with taking the lead, as this would ensure its own security and help to draw a line against the East. Thus, the organization had several roles. Firstly, it was a mean to help the further integration of Europe. Secondly, it strengthened the containment of Communism. And third, it evolved to be the glue that held Europe and America together.

When considering the responses by different administrations, it is possible to see several patterns emerge. One clear pattern is support of European integration as a mean of fighting Communism, with emphasis on how a united Europe is less likely to be influenced by the Soviet Union in contrast to individual states. Also important is how some administrations feared that the economic cost of defending Europe would be too much for the U.S. European integration was encouraged because it would enable Europe to contribute more to its own defense, and thus relieving America of some of the costs. However, the pattern which is really interesting for this thesis is how Europe can be regarded as a "third force." The fear of Europe becoming too strong and independent was present in several administrations during the Cold War, and it was made clear that

Europe had to “behave,” that is not to oppose the U.S. This was not a major concern with every administration, but it was evident that it was a concern which developed over time as the process of European integration accelerated. Following this was the need for a stricter policy towards Europe by the U.S. in order to ensure that the cooperation on American terms continued. Especially the Nixon-Kissinger administration stressed, as mentioned earlier, that Europe had regional responsibilities while the U.S. had global responsibilities. This signaled that the U.S. did not want Europe to be an equal partner and ally, but a partner and ally nonetheless who knew its place. The role of Europe as a “third force” will be discussed more in chapter four of this thesis.

How the different theories used in this chapter relate to the way various executive administrations reacted to Europe reveals different patterns. The presidency of Richard Nixon is covered above, and will not be repeated here. The period of the Carter administration will not be discussed here due to the fact that transatlantic relations during this period were stable, and interaction was at a low. During the presidencies of Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Reagan both “state-centered realism” and “defensive realism” have much relevance. American policies towards Europe during these years were characterized by the fact that the U.S. had experienced an increase in power after World War II. Thus, America tried to influence the development in Europe by promoting integration in the region. In addition, the promotion of regionalism in Europe was triggered by the need to establish a deterrent against Communist aggression from the Soviet Union. American security could then be seen as a motivating factor for promoting European integration. “Empire by invitation” also has much relevance during these presidencies as well as the whole period of the Cold War. Even though transatlantic relations had its ups and downs, the European demand of the presence of American troops in Western Europe remains throughout the whole period. “The new regionalism” on the other hand, has no relevance before the presidency of Richard Nixon, which is discussed above. Nor has it much relevance during the presidency of Carter, since this was a time where there were very few developments in the EC. However, during the Reagan presidency the development of European integration started to accelerate again, making the theory relevant for this period. This is clear when reviewing the adoption of the Single European Act of 1985-86, where “the EC took on new life.”⁸³ The European leadership

⁸³ Lundestad 2003: 231.

was strengthened by President Mitterand, Chancellor Kohl and Commission president Jacques Delors.⁸⁴ Hegemony theory is also relevant to these administrations during the Cold War. By providing security guarantees for protection against the Soviet Union and economic aid to the nations of Western Europe, the U.S. established itself as a hegemon. This situation never changed during the Cold War, or under any of the presidencies which are discussed here. At some point the hegemony was weakened, but it was not broken. This is the core concept of Volgy and Imwalle's article of bipolarity and hegemony during the Cold War. Antonio Gramsci's thoughts about how liberal democracies exercise their power through a dominate world view instead of coercion is also relevant. The U.S. never forced the nations of Western Europe into receiving aid, but they expected them to adapt its values and ideology in return.

⁸⁴ Lundestad 2003: 231.

Chapter 4: The Difference between USA and Europe: The Changing Relationship during the War on Terror.

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the American response to the 9/11 attacks which led to the War on Terror. It also discusses European reactions and the difference of opinion between Europe and America regarding the struggle against global terrorism. Furthermore, the war in Afghanistan is an important part of this chapter, with emphasis on how the U.S. was supported by Europe in its war against the Taliban regime there. The Iraq War, which followed after the war in Afghanistan, shows the contrasts between this and the former military campaign. This war contributed to further deepening of the rift between the two sides of the Atlantic, where European opposition grew strong against American unilateralism.

In addition, this chapter shows how the Iraq War not only led to a disruption of transatlantic relations, but also a division inside the EU itself. Some of the nations of the EU sympathized with the U.S. and supported going to war against Iraq as well as offering military forces to aid the U.S. The role of NATO during the War on Terror is a crucial part in this chapter. The reality after the Cold War is very different and the challenges for this security organization are many. The world system is no longer bipolar, and the enemy is no longer a single actor, but rather a network of actors residing in multiple states. How the U.S. perceives the usefulness of NATO after 9/11 is a discussion subject worth analyzing, and also how this is connected with the American response to regionalism in Europe.

Furthermore, this chapter also discusses and analyzes some aspects of the political and cultural differences between America and Europe, and how these affect American responses to European integration. Does the U.S. feel that the European Union has played out its role and performed its purpose? Is European opposition to American unilateralism a hindrance to U.S. plans? Or does the EU still perform a useful role for the U.S.? American relations with the old Soviet states of Eastern Europe seem to show a degree of loyalty to the U.S. there. Could this be dividing Europe, and in that context would a division of Europe be in American interests? Finally, this chapter

establishes whether the theories from chapter 2 also apply to U.S. responses to regionalism during the current War on Terror.

4.2 America and Europe before 9/11: The Presidency of George W. Bush

When George W. Bush was elected the new president of the U.S., most of Europe was unsure of where he would stand on foreign policy issues. Very early signs of American unilateralism emerging with no regard for international bodies like the U.N. were discomfiting to Europe, as were America's refusal to support the Kyoto Protocol and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. However, in general, Washington was prepared to cooperate in Europe because it was here the U.S. had its most vital allies. This administration also saw the value of NATO as an instrument for America to guide the development in Europe. Despite a positive attitude towards integration in Europe, the relationship between Europe and America during the early period of President Bush's first term was uneasy. Growing U.S. unilateralism, disregard for international bodies and agreements, and a number of economic disputes contributed to a strain in the relationship between Europe and America.⁸⁵ The emphasis on NATO is further discussed later in this chapter under section 4.5.

4.3 Afghanistan

And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban: Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. Release all foreign nationals, including American citizens, you have unjustly imprisoned.....Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to appropriate authorities. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, so we can make sure they are no longer operating. These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion. The Taliban must act, and act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Lundestad 2003: 269-273.

⁸⁶ George W. Bush, "Address to a joint session of Congress and the American people", September 20, 2001, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/> (accessed January 29, 2007).

With this began the war in Afghanistan and the War against terror. This speech by President Bush shows that the U.S. was clear in its demands and would not be compromising. This formed the basis for the Bush administration's war against terrorism and the president proclaimed what was to be called the Bush Doctrine: "We will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbor them."⁸⁷ Following 9/11, the U.S. received massive support from all of its allies and even Vladimir Putin's Russia became a part of the coalition against terrorism. Moral support even came from the Organization of Islamic States.⁸⁸ States joined up and supported the military strike against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, who had close ties with the terrorist organization known as al Qaeda that was allegedly responsible for the attack on America.

With this overwhelming support from Europe it seemed that the Atlantic relationship had been reestablished and was characterized by more harmony than the first months under the new administration. However, the fact that NATO invoked article 5 for the first time, did not mean that the U.S. readily accepted or asked for military assistance from European countries. With the experiences from the Kosovo war in mind, the U.S. wanted exclusive control over operations in Afghanistan. A repetition of the ineffective NATO procedures for fighting a war was not in accordance with the Bush administration's strategy. Initially, there was to be no role for NATO at all. War by a committee did not and does to appeal to Washington.⁸⁹ It is clear that the U.S. administration wanted moral support, but not necessarily military aid in its war against terror in Afghanistan. It is easier to ask for aid after a military operation, because the reconstruction work after a war is always more difficult and expensive. America prefers to be totally autonomous when conducting a war. In addition, Europe, with its emphasis on diplomacy does not fit in with the strategic aspects of the War against Terror. The U.S. prefers direct action over diplomacy and discussion when fighting a war. There is a clear contrast between the two sides of the Atlantic in this respect, and this explains why the U.S. wants to be autonomous and not having to experience allies questioning its tactics. However, everyone seems to be invited to assist with the reconstruction process, at least economically and militarily. This pattern will also be discussed in the section concerning the war in Iraq.

⁸⁷ Lundestad 2003: 273.

⁸⁸ Lundestad 2003: 273.

⁸⁹ Lundestad 2003: 273 – 274.

4.4 The War in Iraq.

After its initial success in Afghanistan, the U.S. turned its attention towards Iraq and Saddam Hussein. The official motivation for this campaign was that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that Saddam Hussein's regime had ties with al Qaeda. At first, certain forces inside the administration were skeptical to including NATO and the UN in the campaign, but in September 2002 the United Nations was asked to support America's decision to invade Iraq. Britain quickly announced its support of U.S. plans for the military intervention in Iraq. However, the rest of the EU was divided on the issue.

France and Germany were particularly skeptical to the use of force and wanted to give the UN inspectors in Iraq more time to establish the existence of weapons of mass destruction. Central and Eastern European countries on the other hand, had strong sympathy for the American-British position. "When the Bush administration announced a new strategic doctrine emphasizing preemption over deterrence this was perceived in Europe as very negative."⁹⁰ No evidence of weapons of mass destruction was found in Iraq, but Washington still prepared for war. This led to increased criticism of the U.S. in Europe, especially from the public. As Germany had refused to offer any military or economic assistance to an American led attack on Iraq, France followed by taking a stand against the U.S. According to President Chirac, America had to be restrained. The relationship between Paris and Washington became cool, but this also led to further division inside the EU. Central and Eastern European countries were afraid of anything that could slow down their integration into NATO, and these nations saw the U.S. as their main protector. The fact that the U.S. still wanted NATO to be the dominant security organization in Europe showed that America feared what the EU as an independent force could do to its sphere of influence. American and British forces attacked Iraq on March 20, 2003 with superior forces crushing Iraqi defenses within a short period of time. Public opinion in Europe continued to be against the invasion, and after a while also in the U.S. and Britain.⁹¹

At the present time America is still struggling to stabilize the new government in Iraq, but this seems to be a most difficult task as Iraq seems to be moving towards civil war. After George W. Bush won the reelection in 2005 the U.S. have made some efforts

⁹⁰ Lundestad 2003: 276.

⁹¹ Lundestad 2003: 275 – 279.

to improve relations with the EU and strengthen the cooperation through NATO. However, the division inside Europe together with the fact that the U.S. is focusing more on “special relationships” with Eastern Europe is making transatlantic relations worse than ever.

4.4 European Opposition and Division.

4.4.1 *The Differences between Europe and America*

With the history of European regionalism and dependency of American support, this requires a closer look on the relationship between the two. European opposition to the war in Iraq did not sit well with the Bush administration. The relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic has been varied since the end of the Cold War.

Britain was America’s strongest supporter for the Iraq War. Other European countries like Italy, Spain, Portugal, Holland, Denmark, Ireland and later several smaller countries from Central and Eastern Europe also openly supported the American campaign. The nations from Western Europe that supported the American campaign “...had traditionally been close to the United States and decidedly Atlantic in their orientation.”⁹² The nations from the Central and Eastern parts, however, saw, and still see, the U.S. as their main protector after the decline of the Soviet Union, and the most important issue for them was their integration into NATO. Another important factor for the support of the U.S. was the frustration among many European countries over the French tendency to appear as the official spokesman for the EU.⁹³

The differences between Europe and America have always been there. One can start with the aftermath of the Second World War, where the two sides faced completely different realities. Europe had been devastated by war, while the U.S. had been strengthened. According to Steinar Hansson, “The U.S. had grown by its wars, and never been in a war which had overthrown its hegemony.”⁹⁴ In contrast to Europe then, the U.S. had benefited from its wars.⁹⁵ This can help us understand why some nations in Europe have a stronger tendency towards diplomacy than military conflict; its history has taught the devastating costs of war. The foundation of the EU is built on a peace dimension. In order to prevent history from repeating itself, the EU shall make sure that

⁹² Lundestad 2003: 276.

⁹³ Lundestad 2003: 276.

⁹⁴ Steinar Hansson, *Vestens Fronter: Amerika – Europa – Norge* (Dinamo Essens: 2003), 42.

⁹⁵ Hansson, 2003: 42-44.

its members never lead aggressive policies toward each other. All states in Europe recognize the necessity of such an arrangement because it is in the interest of everyone. America, on the other hand, has only experienced what can be benefited from war and thus has a stronger tendency toward going to war to achieve its goals. However, Hansson does not seem to take into account the Vietnam War, which severely weakened the U.S. The same can be said about the Korean War and World War II. He still has a good point when we regard the latter. After World War II the U.S. emerged, at first, as the only superpower in the world with nuclear capabilities. Compared to the nations of Europe, America had not been devastated by war and its influence after 1945 had been greatly increased. In that context, it seems credible to suggest that the U.S. had benefited from war.

Noam Chomsky states that “The United States has always had an ambivalent attitude towards Europe.”⁹⁶ On one hand, he argues, there is the view of a unified Europe which would serve U.S. corporations by providing markets. On the other hand, there is the fear of Europe moving off in a different direction than the U.S. He goes on by emphasizing the importance of Eastern Europe, and how easier it is to influence this region of Europe than for example to Germany and France, which are “big, industrial countries that could move in a somewhat more independent direction.”⁹⁷ Chomsky is also preoccupied with the American hatred for the European social system, and he gives this a lot of weight by arguing that undermining the social standards in Western Europe would be a big benefit for the United States.⁹⁸ However, the author of this thesis feels that Chomsky uses words which are too strong. It would be more plausible to say that the current conservative administration perceives some European nations to be too liberal, and that this can generate some skepticism towards the European social system. It is also hard to see how undermining the social system in Europe would be a benefit for the U.S. In addition, Chomsky does not succeed in explaining how undermining the social standards in Europe would be good for the U.S.

The American concern that Europe might take an independent course seems to be strong according to Chomsky. He claims that policy planning since World War II reflects this. He even goes so far as to say that the oil in Iraq is so important to the U.S. that it would tolerate no rivals whatsoever. “....the U.S.’ enemies are Europe and Asia.

⁹⁶ Chomsky 2005: 14.

⁹⁷ Chomsky 2005: 14.

⁹⁸ Chomsky 2005: 13– 15.

These are the regions of the world that could move toward independence.”⁹⁹ According to this view, it would seem that the EU represents a threat more than an ally to the U.S.¹⁰⁰ The reason why Chomsky believes European independence is dangerous for the U.S. is because it would give Europe the power to oppose America. His claim is that the U.S. is afraid of giving up control over states or regions because it is never clear which direction they will then move in regarding support of America. Even though he has some good points, Chomsky’s argumentation is not especially convincing. His ideas tend to be too extreme, but perhaps that is the idea to effectively spice up his message, which is that the U.S. is on a dangerous path towards global hegemony. This thesis believes this view is a little farfetched; it is not likely that the EU will ever be an enemy of the U.S. Despite many disagreements, America and Europe are bound together by both history and common interests. A conflict would not be in the interests of either of them since they both have a degree of dependence on one another. Europe needs America because it is a superpower with substantial military strength. Furthermore, it does not matter how strong a state is, even a superpower needs friends and allies. Especially since the number of enemies of the U.S. are not decreasing as the War on Terror progresses. However, even though extreme, Chomsky’s opinion that the U.S. could regard Europe as an enemy makes an important point. Is Europe becoming more a competitor than an ally? In this context, what would the American response be?

Geir Lundestad stresses that Europe and America have different cultural dispositions: “....views on terrorism, on the use of force, on defense spending and on the environment are different on the two sides of the Atlantic.” These differences make the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic difficult, and cooperation in the war against terror suffers as a result. He argues that these differences are clear when regarding different attitudes to “outlaw governments,” “rogue states” and “the Axis of evil. The U.S. prefers to put heavy pressure on such states while Europe can be said to believe more in “constructive engagement” when dealing with them. Lundestad concludes that none of the approaches seem to have produced results, but this example underlines the major differences in culture between the two sides of the Atlantic.”¹⁰¹

The differences between America and Europe are many. Francis Fukuyama has an important point when he speaks of the difference of perception regarding terrorism:

⁹⁹ Chomsky 2003: 112.

¹⁰⁰ Chomsky 2003: 51 – 52.

¹⁰¹ Lundestad 2007: 19.

Europeans more often tended to assimilate the September 11 attacks to their own experience with terrorism from groups like the Irish Republican Army or the Basque ETA, regarding it as a surprisingly successful one-of-a-kind event, an outlier in a phenomenon more commonly marked by car bombs or assassinations.¹⁰²

For Americans on the other hand, this attack put a tremendous shock on the population and left a scar which will never heal, according to Fukuyama.¹⁰³ The different perceptions of the attacks help explain the difference of opinion on how to act in response. Europe, comparing the attack with their experiences with terrorism, does not react in the same way as the U.S. Many European nations favor diplomacy and dialogue despite the sympathy of America's need for revenge. The U.S., on the other hand, does not have similar experiences to relate to, and thus reacts in a much stronger way. War is the only way to make it right, to retaliate and have revenge.

Svein Melbye also talks about basic differences which enhance the rift between the U.S. and the EU. First of all is their different preference when concerning the forming of the international system. The U.S. favors keeping its position as the only global superpower, while the EU, and then especially France, does not want to see the American position remain unchallenged. According to Melbye, "Seen through the eyes of the French, a combined Europe within the EU and under French-German leadership would be the most natural and realistic power political competitor to the U.S."¹⁰⁴ It would seem that after 2003, other European states, in addition to Germany, also share the French view. Another area of difference is when it comes to a shared assessment of threats. After the Cold War, a period when European security was important for both parts came the reality of Europe not being in need of American security to the same extent anymore. In addition, Europe is no longer the primary place where threats against American security are situated. For example, most politicians and experts in both the U.S. and Europe agree that international terrorism and the spreading of weapons of mass destruction are the greatest challenges to global security in our time. However, according to Melbye, it is clear that the view of these threats made by the Bush administration is different from the view in Europe. He argues that both sides of the Atlantic agree that the U.S. is the main target for terrorists, and that especially

¹⁰² Fukuyama 2006: 68.

¹⁰³ Fukuyama 2006: 68 – 69.

¹⁰⁴ Melbye 2004: 206.

Europeans believe that Europe is a secondary target. Whereas the threat from terrorism is given a lot more weight in the U.S., it is received more with ease in Europe.¹⁰⁵ With the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, however, it would seem that Europe is not safe from terrorism either.

Differences between the two sides of the Atlantic are one issue; it helps to explain the growing frustration the two parties have with each other. The core subject of this thesis, however, is American responses to regionalism in Europe. What are these responses? It would seem that when we regard the support from Eastern European countries and the recognition they get in return (Poland was given an area of responsibility in the rebuilding of Iraq), that European integration might not serve U.S. interests in the same way anymore. By pushing Western Europe aside and strengthening relations with the East, it would seem that the Bush administration favors a division of Europe. This way, the administration neutralizes those who oppose its policies, and receives new allies when creating stronger bonds with Eastern Europe. Furthermore, it is much easier for the U.S. to relate to single leaders of different states, than a “committee” of many representatives from several nations.

European regionalism does not have the same value anymore for the U.S., at least not on the political level. The economic advantages, however, will probably be sustained. Even though Europe has gained a lot of power and independence by integrating its economy, and the U.S. faces difficulties when trying to oppose Europe on economic issues, the EU does not stand fully united. Politically, the Bush administration’s actions towards Eastern Europe resemble the old standard “divide and conquer” strategy, where a disobedient Europe is neutralized by dividing it in two; one for and one against the Iraq War. It is worth considering whether the division of Europe was created internally by Europeans or externally by the U.S. Is it possible that such disagreements would have surfaced without the Iraq War? This is a difficult question to answer, but one thing is certain, and that is that the Bush administration certainly took advantages of the division in the EU.

¹⁰⁵ Melbye 2004: 204 – 209.

4.4.2 European Division

As the divergent European responses to the Iraqi war revealed, most of Western Europe rejected the Bush Doctrine's rationale for unilateral military action in favour of diplomacy and a combination of economic incentives and sanctions to encourage the peaceful resolution of international crises.¹⁰⁶

However, the largest form of criticism came from France and Germany. Other European nations, along with Britain, openly supported the American plans for a pre-emptive strike on Iraq, or they favored an internationalist approach, that is emphasis on the UN and the Security Council, on the conflict.¹⁰⁷

The emphasis on Eastern Europe was clear when Donald Rumsfeld spoke of the separation between the "New Europe" and the "Old Europe." He did so, knowing well that several Eastern European decision makers were prepared to give America support for the Iraq War. The famous "letter of the eight," was a statement made by eight heads of state in Central and Eastern Europe, where they pledge their support to the American led war in Iraq. None of the other countries in the EU saw this coming, and reactions were strong, especially in France, Germany and Greece. "These developments chimed well with the Rumsfeld view that France and Germany could be brushed aside as 'Old Europe' while a 'New Europe', its 'centre of gravity moving east', understood better the new geo-politics around the Bush Doctrine."¹⁰⁸ In this context, a division of Europe served the Bush administration well when it came to support for the war in Iraq. Moreover, the ongoing plan of placing a missile defense in Eastern Europe, more specifically in Poland and The Czech Republic, shows the importance of this part of Europe for the Bush administration. The official view states the following regarding the geographical deployment of the missile defense:

So in order to defend Europe, for technical reasons, we determined it was best to have a modest installation in Poland, with radars in the Czech Republic. That allows us to defend almost all of NATO. And that's certainly in our interest. So

¹⁰⁶ M. Donald Hancock and Brandon Valeriano, "Western Europe," in *The Bush doctrine and the War on Terrorism : global responses, global consequences*, ed. Robert Singh and Mary Buckley, (London : Routledge, 2006), 42.

¹⁰⁷ Hancock and Valeriano 2006: 33 – 38.

¹⁰⁸ George Blazysca, "Poland and Central Europe," in *The Bush doctrine and the War on Terrorism : global responses, global consequences*, ed. Robert Singh and Mary Buckley, (London : Routledge, 2006), 46 – 47.

this is first of all about defending Europe, not about defending the United States.¹⁰⁹

The fact that the U.S. claims that its actions are purely for the defense of Europe, is perhaps a little hard to believe. Clearly, there must be other motives behind this. The emphasis on European defense probably comes from the intent of strengthening American security. Thus, this underlines the importance of Europe for the preservation of the security of the U.S. It is hard to believe that Bush administration would engage in such a project solely for the protection of Europe. Furthermore, the renewed emphasis by the administration on “special relationships” is very disturbing for the rest of Europe. This discussion will continue in section 4.5.

4.5 The Role of NATO

In the beginning of President Bush’s first term, Washington was prepared to act in a cooperative manner in U.S.-Euro relations. Europe was where America’s closest allies were situated, and “NATO gave the United States a unique instrument with which to guide developments in Europe.”¹¹⁰ According to Geir Lundestad, the U.S. believed that the expansion of NATO meant strengthening America’s role in Europe. After America had been attacked by terrorists on September 11, 2001, NATO invoked its Article 5 for the first time. This meant that the attack was considered to be an attack on all NATO members, and they all were obligated to assist America. Washington realized the need for support when fighting terrorism, and appreciated the support from members of NATO.¹¹¹ At this point, transatlantic relations seemed to have moved into a harmonic state of cooperation and the importance of NATO had been reaffirmed.

Strong disagreements between Europe and the U.S. became apparent when America revealed its plans to extend the war against terrorism by preparing to invade Iraq and possibly Iran and North Korea. “There was an increasing suspicion in Europe that Washington was not considering its NATO allies quite as necessary as before.”¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ Daniel Fried, “On-Camera Interview with Kasia Slawinska of Polish TVN Warsaw,” Poland, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, March 21, 2007, (US Department of State), <http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/82075.htm> (accessed April 18, 2007).

¹¹⁰ Lundestad 2003: 271.

¹¹¹ Lundestad 2003: 271 – 273.

¹¹² Lundestad 2003: 274.

Even though the U.S. welcomed support from NATO, it was clear, according to Lundestad that America preferred to have exclusive control over the war in Afghanistan. With the decision to go to war in Iraq the U.S. turned away from NATO, and instead relied on an ad hoc coalition of the willing. Furthermore, the new conflicts which were far away from Europe made NATO less relevant for the U.S. However, according to Lundestad, the U.S. still wanted NATO to be the most important security organization in Europe. “The Bush administration was much more afraid of the EU becoming an independent force than its predecessor had been.”¹¹³ In order to disrupt the EU’s military plan, Washington wanted to establish a rapid reaction force within NATO, and even try to tie the EU closer to NATO. This, as mentioned in previous chapters, shows America’s fear of Europe evolving into a third force in international relations. The Bush administration had begun to regard NATO as less relevant than before. However, it still preferred that the military structure of Europe remained in the Atlantic framework rather than a separate European army outside American control. The administration demanded that NATO should be modernized; otherwise it would become even less relevant to Washington.¹¹⁴

During the Cold War, NATO was a most efficient organization for dealing with the Soviet Union. Since the war on terror began, things have changed. Terrorism must be dealt with on many different levels. It became clear that the current administration regarded NATO as less relevant than before. “NATO was to become America’s “toolbox” or “force multiplier” for interventions outside Europe.”¹¹⁵ The experience from Kosovo had shown the U.S. that conducting a war led by a committee was not effective. However, the U.S. stressed that the EU should not establish forces which could limit NATO’ supremacy. This meant of course limiting U.S. supremacy, which still needs NATO despite its growing unilateralist approach under the Bush administration.¹¹⁶

The recent plans by the U.S. to establish a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, more specifically in Poland and the Czech Republic, have brought concern to both the EU and NATO. The fact that the U.S. has chosen to make agreements with these nations instead of dealing with the EU or NATO has created much uproar. This

¹¹³ Lundestad 2003: 278.

¹¹⁴ Lundestad 2003: 273 - 279.

¹¹⁵ Lundestad 2007: 4.

¹¹⁶ Lundestad 2007: 3 - 5.

issue shows how NATO, if not useful to the U.S., is overlooked. If it cannot function as an instrument for American foreign policy, then it is to be put aside.

4.6 America and Europe in the War on Terror: Applying the Theories.

4.6.1 “*Empire by Invitation*”

Geir Lundestad’s theory of “empire by invitation” does not seem to have the same strong relevance today as it had during the Cold War. With the development of Europe into a bloc consisting of twenty-seven countries, the EU now stands more as an independent actor on the world arena. The economies and military capabilities of the nations of Europe are no longer in ruin, but that does not mean that they are not dependent on the United States anymore. The EU is still not militarily integrated, and needs the U.S. as the primary guarantor of security and for exerting leadership in NATO. With the growing European independence and power comes a stronger desire to state one’s own interests. The fact that the EU has developed into a significant actor in the international arena means that Lundestad’s “empire by invitation” does not apply to the same extent anymore. Europe prefers the U.S. as an ally and partner, but the relationship is to be characterized by equality to a larger extent than before.

However, even though the invitational aspect is almost gone in Western Europe (although not entirely), the reality is different in Eastern Europe. Several Central and Eastern European governments are, according to Lundestad, actively inviting the Americans in.¹¹⁷ It would appear that these states and their governments are now filling the role Western Europe had during the Cold War. Given their history with the Soviet Union, it is not difficult to understand why they invite the U.S. These states fear for their security from a revitalized Russia which could pose a threat in the future, and the only one capable of providing security for them is America.

The Bush administration on the other hand, sees the danger of promoting a strong EU, whose loyalty could not be taken for granted after Iraq. This is when the emphasis on “New Europe” instead of “Old Europe” (as Donald Rumsfeld termed it) began.¹¹⁸ It would seem that even though the U.S. officially supports European integration, the dangers are many, and America could possibly benefit from a division

¹¹⁷ Lundestad 2007: 6.

¹¹⁸ Lundestad 2007: 6.

in Europe. As long as invitations from one part of Europe continue, this will have a strong impact on the EU and the transatlantic relationship.

4.6.2 “The New Regionalism”

Bjørn Hettne’s theory of “the new regionalism” is even more useful after the Cold War. Its description of the development of European integration has been well documented during the War on Terror. The EU is now much more than it was during the Cold War, and the strongest motivations have always come from within Europe. This is even truer now than before. As America may show skepticism towards support of a unified Europe, the nations of Europe understand the value of integration and how far the EU has come in the process of regionalism.

Geir Lundestad argues that Americans are too impatient, and that they underestimate the progress that the EU is making. These critics of regionalism tend to point out how slow the process of integration is, and often emphasizes the EU’s failures rather than its successes. “The EU has been able to combine geographical widening and a deepening of content. European integration has expanded from six to nine to twelve to fifteen to twenty-seven members.”¹¹⁹ There is no doubt that the EU has accomplished great things, and will continue to do so, even though it will take more time. “the new regionalism” is thus more suited than ever to explain the process of integration in Europe. In his article, “The Metrosexual Superpower,” Parag Khanna argues how the EU is successful in combining its soft and hard power:

Brand Europe is taking over. From environmental sustainability and international law to economic development and social welfare, European views are more congenial to international tastes and more easily exported than their U.S. variants. Even the Bush administration's new strategy toward the “Greater Middle East” is based on the Helsinki model, which was Europe's way of integrating human rights standards into collective security institutions.¹²⁰

Khanna also emphasizes how other regional organizations such as ASEAN, Mercosure and the African Union are copying the institutional framework of the EU.¹²¹ This certainly applies to Hettne’s “new regionalism,” since the emphasis on this theory

¹¹⁹ Lundestad 2007: 6.

¹²⁰ Parag Khanna, “The Metrosexual Superpower,” *Foreign Policy* 16, August 2004, (Yale Global Online), <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4366> (site accessed April 25, 2007).

¹²¹ Khanna 2004.

in addition to initiatives coming from within, is also on how the EU can be a model for other regionalist projects to follow.

However, the EU still has a long way to go in order to fulfill all the aspects of “the new regionalism.” It possesses some characteristics of a region-state, but it is still unable to coherently act as one single actor in all areas. Again, economically it is a regional actor with success, but militarily it lacks signs of success. The division of Europe on the Iraq War may disrupt the further integration of Europe and thus the explanatory power of this theory, but the battle for a common foreign and defense policy is not over yet. The division in Europe over Iraq needs further studies in relation to “the new regionalism.”

After the attacks on the World Trade Center, the U.S. chose to go to war in Afghanistan and Iraq, because Washington decided that both these states were a threat to American security and responsible for the first major attack on American soil since the founding of the United States. However, the argument for invading Iraq was to remove Saddam Hussein and his alleged weapons of mass destruction. While support in Europe for intervention in Afghanistan was wide, the situation was different for the war in Iraq. European opposition, and then especially Western European opposition, contributed to a negative response to regionalism in Europe. The remarks made by former Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld confirm this. His emphasis on “New Europe,” meaning Eastern Europe, versus “Old Europe,” meaning Western Europe shows how the U.S. have tried to influence the development of European integration. When the U.S. received support from the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, this not only weakened the process of integration and the position of the EU, but it also showed the Bush administration that regionalism in Europe did not necessarily promote U.S. interests.

According to George Blazcya, the emphasis on joining NATO versus joining the EU, was important as an emblem for some nations of Eastern Europe. Membership in NATO would mean little commitment, but huge benefits in the form of security from the only superpower in the world, namely the U.S. The fear of a revitalized Russia once again turning its eyes towards its former satellite states was a strong motive for supporting America in this region. In addition, Balzycya argues that especially Poland had ambitions of its own when supporting the war in Iraq. According to him, Poland was hoping for materialistic “rewards” in the reconstruction of Iraq and thus benefiting from this economically. There is no doubt that this division inside the EU has weakened

the process of European regionalism and that it has created a rift which will take some time to close. “....the test for the future will be to figure out what NATO is for and to make the enlarged EU work effectively, bridging the gap between those members that live under the strong fears of Russia and those where such fears are absent.”¹²² There is no doubt that the EU will enter a turbulent period which will not be easy to manage, the success of European regionalism depends on the desire to find order and a new commitment to Europe.¹²³

4.6.3 “Defensive Realism”

The core concept of Robert Jervis’ notions of “defensive realism” is that states expand their influence because they seek security. In addition, the concept that one state seeking security may have a negative effect on other states is worth analyzing when reviewing American foreign policy during the War on Terror.

As mentioned, the U.S. still have strong interests in Europe and have attempted to establish closer relations with the nations of Eastern Europe, which have on their part, issued invitations to the U.S. If these advances by the Bush administration., namely to cooperate with some nations of the EU while ignoring others, can be seen as actions to ensure American security, then “defensive realism” still has some importance for the period of the War on Terror. More allies are needed in the War on Terror, and especially to get things right in Iraq. Moreover, the proposal to establish a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic can be seen as actions aimed at preserving American security. However, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. claims that this system is for the preservation of European security. When one considers the American need for security and that the motivation behind any actions of the U.S. usually are in the interests of America, it seems likely that this is a part of a larger plan for increasing both the influence and security of the U.S. itself. Thus, this action by the Bush administration is an example which justifies the core concept of “defensive realism.”

Jervis’ notions of elements of a security dilemma and whether a state faces a likeminded partner or not, are more difficult to apply. The U.S. does not face another superpower which it can geographically and militarily relate to, but a network of terrorist residing in multiple countries. Nor does it engage a state, which makes it

¹²² Blazyca 2006: 55.

¹²³ Blazyca 2006: 45 – 55.

difficult to apply many of the aspects of “defensive realism” on how the U.S. handles its foreign policy towards the al Qaeda, and how this affects responses to regionalism in Europe.

4.6.4 “State-centered Realism”

Farheed Zakaria’s theory of “state-centered realism” makes the assumption that a state expands when it experiences a growth in power. Furthermore, this theory is limited to explaining foreign policy, in addition to focusing on how states see an opportunity to expand. That had been a strong critique of the theory, suggesting that it is not sufficient to only concentrating on foreign policy without taking into account elements of domestic policy which can have an effect on the former.

Applying this theory on American foreign policy during the ongoing War on Terror reveals a different scenario than that of the Cold War, and it is more difficult to apply to this new age. The U.S. is today the world’s only superpower, no other state can be said to be able to match it and successfully compete as a rival. In other words, the power of the U.S. is at a peak. However, the scene of battle is not in Europe anymore and this region’s importance to the U.S. has decreased since the end of the Cold War. By using this theory in the same way as “defensive realism,” it is possible to argue that it explains American responses to the nations of Eastern Europe. The lack of support from Western Europe led to tying a closer relationship to the East, especially since these nations pledged their support to an American led invasion of Iraq. The motives of the nations in Eastern Europe for their support of the U.S. are discussed more thoroughly under section 4.6.2 above. The fact that the U.S. is at a peak when it comes to its power increases the probability that it would use its power and influence by ensuring the cooperation of these nations. By taking this road of action, the U.S. contributes, as well as the nations of Eastern and Central Europe, to the weakening of the EU and regionalism in Europe.

. Thus, this thesis understands the necessity of using both “defensive realism” and “state-centered realism” in order to perform a sustainable explanation of American foreign policy. However, it is the conclusion of this thesis that these two theories are not as sufficient in explaining American responses to European regionalism during the War on Terror as they are for analyzing responses during the Cold War.

4.6.5 “Hegemony Theory”

Volgy and Imwalle’s theory of hegemony and bipolarity during the Cold War does not apply during the War on Terror. This theory was based on the principle of bipolarity which does not exist as it did during the Cold War. Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony,” however, is important when explaining the relationship between America and Europe during the War on Terror. However, its relevance has decreased compared to the period of the Cold War. With growing European integration comes the weakening of American cultural domination. The U.S. does not fill the role as the sole protector of Europe anymore for two reasons. First, the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Second, Europe has grown in power itself and is not in dire need of assistance and protection from America anymore.

The U.S. cannot be said to be a hegemon which is dominating Europe, the integration of the nations of Europe has led to the EU emerging as a more independent force capable of stating its own interests in world politics. However, its influence is still substantial. For example, in the cultural sphere, the concept of a mass consumption culture exists in both Europe and America; its origins can be traced back to the latter. This was one of the chief exports during the early years of the Cold War. A clear example of this is the strong impact that American movie and TV culture has on Europe, and the rest of the world for that matter. The crucial point here is the fact that most of Europe watches American movies and TV- shows, and to a certain extent copy these and make their own national variants. McDonald’s restaurants are well represented throughout European cities. This list can be made longer, but the conclusion here is that parts of American culture have melted into European culture and this is in accordance with the central aspects of “cultural hegemony.” The U.S. economy is closely tied to the economies of the nations of Europe, which is clear as these are affected when the American dollar decreases in value. If the U.S. economy would collapse, so would the economies of Europe. The impact of the U.S. in political sphere is also considerable, something which is very clear when we look at international politics and the UN. Without the support of the U.S., organizations like the UN and the EU find it difficult to make decisions and execute them. In addition, the U.S. has much influence over NATO and its members. To conclude, the U.S. is no longer a hegemon dominating Europe, but it still possesses a large degree of influence.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter discusses how the relationship between America and Europe once again has been put to a test by disagreement over the war in Iraq. In addition to transatlantic relations worsening, the growing division inside Europe itself is also a consequence of American foreign policy in the Middle East. An important part of this chapter is applying the theories of chapter two on the realities of the War on Terror.

The Bush administration continued the American tradition of supporting regionalism in Europe when it came into office, even though there was some skepticism of a united and enlarged EU becoming too independent and influential in the international arena. Signs of unilateralism in American foreign policy did worry the nations of Europe, who feared that the U.S. would isolate itself from the rest of the world once more.

The attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, put a halt to problems in transatlantic relations. All of Europe sympathized with the U.S. and offered its support to the superpower when it launched an attack on Afghanistan and the terrorist organization known as the al Qaeda. However, it became clear that the U.S. wanted to have exclusive control over the campaign and was not interested in involving NATO or the UN until later when the war was over.

The war in Iraq seriously damaged transatlantic relations, and had a negative impact on America's response to European regionalism as well as the process of regionalism in Europe. First, the opposition from some of the nations in the EU to American hostility towards Iraq contributed to cooling down the relationship between the two. Second, the EU was divided into those who opposed the Iraq War and those who supported the U.S. intervention. This division of Europe had a negative effect on European regionalism in the sense that EU was not able to speak with one voice. Thus, this weakened the process of European integration further, both by the fact that some nations chose to support the U.S., but also by how America embraced the responses by these nations. Rumsfeld's remarks of "Old Europe" and "New Europe" cooled down transatlantic relations once again. The issues regarding a missile defensive system in Eastern Europe is also worsening transatlantic relations. The U.S. is focusing on "special relationships" with individual states instead of dealing with the EU.

The role of NATO has changed much since the Cold War days. Its importance to the U.S. has decreased and is regarded more as a "tool box" to be used by America

than a collective security organization. On the other hand, the concern that the EU would rise as an independent military power has prompted the U.S. to encourage military integration under NATO in Europe. This way, America has more control over developments in Europe. The issue of a missile defense system in Eastern Europe also weakens the position and role of NATO, as the U.S. prefers not to involve the organization but instead focus on “coalitions of the willing.”

Geir Lundestad’s “empire by invitation” theory is still relevant during the War on Terror period. Even though invitations from Western Europe have more or less ended, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe are pledging their support to the U.S. These nations see America as their protector, and will not do anything to compromise that relationship and thus their own security. In Eastern Europe there is some concern that Russia might one day be revitalized and again seek to exert its influence. This underlines the importance of having a good relationship with the U.S.

“The new regionalism” as described by Bjørn Hettne can be said to be more important than ever. In a period where the EU is evolving more and more on many levels and the motivation still comes strongly from within, it has started to find its place in the international arena. Granted, the EU still has a long way to go, especially when it comes to forming a unified foreign policy, a common constitution and military integration, but the development since the Cold War has been astonishing.

The notions of “defensive realism” as presented by Robert Jervis also have some relevance during the War on Terror. When facing opposition from most of the Western part of the EU, the U.S. tries to establish closer relations with Central and Eastern European states. By doing this the U.S. indirectly contributes to the weakening of the process of European regionalism, but in this context this serves the interest of America, which gains support for its policy towards Iraq. The reason for waging a war in Iraq is first and foremost motivated by the American pursuit for security. However, this thesis admits that his theory is not especially suitable for explaining the American response to European integration when concerning the War on Terror.

Farheed Zakaria’s theory “state-centered realism” has elements which can apply to how the U.S. responds to regionalism in Europe during the War on Terror, but like “defensive realism,” its relevance has decreased compared to the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War the U.S. stood alone as the world’s only superpower after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. was, and is, the most powerful military force in the world. It is possible to view the American support of Central and Eastern Europe as

“New Europe” as a way of once more establishing more influence in the region by disrupting the process of regionalism in Europe.

Volgy and Imwalle’s article of hegemony and bipolarity has no relevance during the War on Terror because the Cold War is over and the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony” is still relevant during the War on Terror. However, America is not a hegemon which dominates Europe anymore, the integration of European nations can be said to have prevented this. With growing regionalism in Europe, where the EU develops into a “region-state,” the possibility of an American hegemony decreases. However, Gramsci’s theory can still be applied to the aspect of a mass consumption culture, something which both Europe and America shares. This culture, which was exported from the U.S. during the early years of the Cold War, represents the enormous impact of American way of life on Europe. In addition, the impact of the U.S. in the political and economic sphere is still considerable. Especially important is the influence the U.S. has over NATO. To conclude; instead of being able to dominate Europe as a hegemon, the U.S. has at this time a strong influence of the nations of Europe. The further development of European regionalism may contribute to decrease this influence in the future.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

5.1 Introduction

This thesis has made an analysis of the relationship between the United States and Europe, more specifically; the emphasis has been on America's responses to European Regionalism. The analysis has compared two different time periods concerning American responses to European integration and these are the Cold War and the current War on Terror. The main goal of this thesis has been to establish whether there is a pattern to be found when looking at U.S. responses during these two periods.

5.2 Theories

The theories used in thesis seem to have stronger explanatory powers when it comes to analyzing American responses to regionalism in Europe during the Cold War. The exception is Bjørn Hettne's theory of "the new regionalism," which is more effective in the analysis of the War on Terror.

Geir Lundestad's theory of "empire by invitation" is invaluable when it comes to analyzing both American and European responses during the Cold War. This theory explains how Western Europe welcomed American leadership, and how this contributed to the U.S. achieving important foreign policy goals in the fight against Communism. However, even though the U.S. did obtain many of its goals by promoting European integration, the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic were not always that harmonic. In the period from 1969 to 1977, the U.S. was weakened by the Vietnam War and Western Europe was starting to move towards greater independence and demanding more influence. Despite the fact that Europe was moving towards a more independent role, the fact remained that the invitation for the presence of American troops in Europe endured. As a matter of fact, it was almost a demand. Europe still needed the security guarantee which only the U.S. could provide.

"Empire by invitation" does not on the other hand, have as much relevance during the War on Terror as it had when dealing with the Cold War. Invitations from Western Europe have more or less stopped completely since the EU has now evolved

into much more than a “fellowship” of European countries. However, invitations have started to come from several nations in Central and Eastern Europe. Especially the states in the east are concerned about losing the American security guarantee. The support from these nations to the war in Iraq is more complex than it would seem. Motivation to support the U.S. has to do with security. America presents a guarantee against a Russia which may be revitalized in the future. Some countries, however, have other reasons for participating in the campaign. Poland, as one example, has achieved materialistic gains from supporting of the U.S.

Bjørn Hettne’s theory of “the new regionalism” is as mentioned, not supposed to apply to the period of the Cold War. This thesis argues however, that the seeds which were sown concerning European integration during this period can only be explained by using Hettne’s theory. The emphasis of “new regionalism” on how initiatives started to come from within is clear when we look at the developments in the period from 1969 to 1977. With the inclusion of Great Britain in the EC, the focus of Western Europe moved towards integration instead of “special relationships” with the U.S. Thus, regionalism in Europe began to serve the interests of the nations of Western Europe more than those of the U.S.

“The new regionalism” and its relevance to the period of the War on Terror is an important part of this thesis. The EU now has twenty-seven members and the integration process has made major developments since the Cold War. Its economic power is considerable, and also, to a certain extent, its political power deserves attention. The initiatives and control over the process are mostly coming from within Europe; the U.S. is not supervising or influencing integration to the same extent anymore. In addition, the EU has now become an example for other regionalist projects to base their institutional founding on. Examples of these are ASEAN, Mercosure and the African Union.

Robert Jervis’ notions of “defensive realism” also contribute to explaining American responses to regionalism in Europe. “Defensive realism” and its emphasis on how states expand due to security reasons are well suited for the realities of the Cold War. This thesis concludes that the U.S. expanded its influence in Europe by promoting integration in the region for security reasons. A strengthened and integrated Europe posed an effective deterrent against Communist expansion, which was in the interest of America.

The importance of “defensive realism” seems to have been decreased when applying Jervis’ notions to the realities of the War on Terror. Europe is not that closely tied with American security anymore, even though the U.S. still have strong interests in the region. The U.S. is currently struggling with the situation in Iraq, and has since the beginning of the War on Terror faced opposition from most parts of Western Europe. However, the nations of Central and especially those of Eastern Europe continue to make efforts to have good relations with the U.S. The support of these nations can be seen as important to American security. Moreover, the proposal to establish missile shields in Poland and the Czech Republic suggests that American security is still connected to Europe, even though its interests and influence have now moved more to the East.

Fareed Zakaria’s theory of “state-centered realism” is also possible to use as an explanation of how the U.S. responded to integration in Europe. When reviewing the role which the U.S. possessed after World War II, it makes sense to apply this theory. America had experienced a growth in power compared to everyone else, and expanded its influence in Europe because it could, by promoting regionalism. However, this thesis concentrates on a specific period during the Cold War, namely the years from 1969 to 1977 where the U.S. had been weakened by the war in Vietnam. By experiencing this weakness the U.S. tried to encourage “special relationships” with Britain and France, who were at this point more interested in the process of European integration. To conclude then, “state-centered realism” has some usefulness in explaining American responses to regionalism in Europe during this period of the Cold War.

“State-centered realism” seems to have lost most of its importance when reviewing the War on Terror. Once again, the U.S. appears to be at a peak when it comes to power, and it is the only superpower in the world. However, it has not been influencing Europe in the same way as it did during the early period of the Cold War. With the EU emerging as a significant actor in its own, Zakaria’s theory of how states expand because they can, does not apply to the U.S. and its response to regionalism in Europe during the War on Terror. In this context, “defensive realism,” an object for criticism by Zakaria, is more suited to explain American responses and actions toward Europe. It is more useful for this thesis to argue that security reasons, rather than expansion only because one can, due to increased power, are creating the American responses towards regionalism in Europe.

The impact of hegemony on the relationship between Europe and America during the Cold War, as described by Volgy and Imwalle, is substantial. When following their argument it becomes clear that the U.S., as the hegemon, presided over Europe and had the strength and ability to prevent Communism from disrupting its hegemony during the Cold War. Thus, this helps to explain how America became a hegemon when encouraging and supporting regionalism in Europe. Moreover, the concept of cultural domination is important in this context. As originally presented by Antonio Gramsci, this idea focuses on how the hegemon relies on values instead of power as means of “ruling.” America’s cultural impact on Western Europe was strong, perhaps strongest in the early face of the Cold War. The export of American movies, clothing, literature, music and food heavily influenced Western Europe. America had the economic and military power to set the rules of the game after being invited by the Europeans. Europe, in exchange for receiving economic and military aid, had to embrace the American system of liberal values in economy and politics. In addition, Gramsci’s ideas concerning how the hegemon needs to make sacrifices in order to achieve and sustain its hegemony, are important when considering the Cold War. America did sacrifice certain economic interests, but this was necessary for the further development of the integration of Europe.

Volgy and Imwalle’s theory of hegemony and bipolarity during the Cold War does not apply during the War on Terror. Firstly, the Cold War is over and the U.S. is the only superpower left in the World after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Secondly, the U.S. can not be seen as a hegemon presiding over Europe and setting the rules anymore as the EU has evolved up to much higher level than before. However, Antonio Gramsci’s theory of “cultural hegemony” has much significance even during the War on Terror. Even though American culture and values tend to differ, there are also many similarities. The export of a mass-consumer culture still prevails in Europe today, a culture which came from the U.S. In addition, American music and movies still have a strong impact on the cultures of Europe. This thesis does not conclude, however, that Europe is without such a culture itself, but only that the impact of American culture in these areas are still significant and thus strengthens the theory of “cultural hegemony.” Furthermore, the U.S. is no longer a dominating hegemon, but resembles more a hegemon with strong influence over Europe. This is clear when we look at how the American economy greatly affects the economies of the nations of Europe, but also how

the U.S. influences Europe politically in international forums such as the UN and other international organizations.

5.3 The Cold War and the War on Terror

5.3.1 *The Cold War*

The American response to regionalism varied greatly during the years of the Cold War. This theoretical analysis of this thesis has concentrated on a specific period during the Cold War, namely the years from 1969 to 1977. During this period the U.S. was, as mentioned, weakened by the war in Vietnam. Its responses to regionalism in Europe were to try and establish “special relationships” with France and Great Britain in order to slow down the integration process. The reason for this was the growing fear of Europe becoming too strong and independent while the power and influence of the U.S. had decreased. From being initially positive to European integration, the U.S. had moved to a more skeptical view of regionalism in Europe. Especially the Nixon administration took steps to tone down its promotion of the integration process. On the other hand, both sides realized their dependency on each other. Even though Europe was becoming stronger, the need for American troops to stay in Europe remained. The fact that the nations of Western Europe had begun to establish their own policies towards the Soviet Union did not mean that they were ready to lose the American security guarantee. The U.S. certainly needed Europe in the sense that the region functioned as a deterrent against Communism.

When considering the different responses by U.S. administrations to regionalism in Europe, there are clear patterns to detect. It would seem that whenever European integration was in the interest of the U.S., it was strongly promoted. The many goals perceived by different American administrations weighed heavily on the decisions which were made. Western Europe functioning as a deterrent against Communism was one issue. However, the need for the nations of Europe to begin to finance a part of their own defense was also an important goal for the U.S. European security did not come cheap. The U.S. also had the ambition of huge benefits from the European market, something which did not exactly go as planned due to European protectionism.

Both the idea and the concern of Europe as a “third force” is a continuing pattern with several U.S. administrations regarding the response to regionalism in Europe. It is

especially the concern of Europe becoming too powerful and then turning against the U.S. which led to the cooling down of the promotion of European integration. As European integration progressed, so did the concern that Europe might break away and oppose the U.S. For the Nixon administration it was important to make sure that Europe understood that its responsibilities were regional, while the U.S. had global responsibilities. Europe was not supposed to be a “third force” in the sense of a competitor who could challenge the U.S. The American view implied the EU as a regional actor that functioned as a partner and ally, although one that knew its place. Other patterns when considering American responses are the idea of European integration as a deterrent against Communism. No administration contested the importance this. Another important pattern was the concern regarding the economic cost of defending Europe, and how integration would enable Europe to start pulling some of its own weight.

5.3.2 The Role of NATO during the Cold War

Following the founding of NATO after World War II most European nations agreed that the American commitment to NATO should be as deep as possible. The role of NATO as a defense against Communist expansion was as important for Europe as it was for the U.S. The process of integration in Europe was under the influence of the U.S., and this was also the case for NATO. It would appear that the American emphasis on NATO would suggest that the U.S. preferred this development instead of a united Europe playing a stronger military role. Seeing as the nations of Europe welcomed American leadership in NATO, the U.S. was given an opportunity to influence the process of integration in Europe as well as the development of NATO during the Cold War. In the period of the Cold War, NATO was an efficient organization for a defense against an expanding Soviet Union.

5.3.3 The War on Terror

When George W. Bush took the oath as president of the U.S., politicians all over Europe did not know what to make of him and how Euro-US relations would be in the future. Even though the Bush administration did not pay too much attention to relations with foreign countries in the beginning, it resumed the policy of supporting

integration in Europe, despite some skepticism about the role of the EU in international politics. In Europe, there were concerns about the growing signs of American unilateralism and isolationism.

The war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq stand as two very clear contrasts regarding transatlantic relations. The first war was characterized by an overwhelming support to a U.S. in grief over terrorist attacks which sought retribution towards the al Qaeda, while the second war cooled down relations between the two sides of the Atlantic. Furthermore, it also contributed to a division among the members of the EU.

The opposition that the U.S. faced from parts of Europe made the Bush administration less positive to integration in Europe, and more concerned with “special relationships.” The emphasis on “Old Europe” versus “New Europe” not only worsened relations between Western Europe and the U.S., but it also had a negative impact on the integration process and the position of the EU. It became clear that the EU was not able to speak with one voice regarding international issues. The most recent issue concerning American policies towards Eastern Europe is the deployment of a missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic. The argument from the US government is that this will offer protection from a possible missile attack from Iran. Furthermore, Washington claims that the security of Europe is the important issue in this context. However, it seems likely that the security of the U.S. is the primary goal behind this action. The security of Europe has only been important in the past when it has been linked with the security of the U.S. It does not appear to be probable that this has changed during the War on Terror.

Despite the fact that the Bush administration showed an interest in cooperation with NATO and the EU after the reelection in 2005, it would seem that the U.S. has not been, and is not interested in, this kind of cooperation if it does not correspond with American interests. The emphasis on “special relationships” once again would suggest that the U.S. is using the old strategy of “divide and conquer” by forming close relationships with some nations in the EU and thus weakening the process of integration and the position of the EU.

5.3.4 The Role of NATO during the War on Terror

In its first term, the Bush administration was prepared to cooperate more with the EU. NATO seemed to be a most effective instrument for the U.S. to influence the

development in Europe. American promoted the expansion of NATO because it believed that this meant strengthening the role of the U.S. in Europe. After the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, NATO invoked its article 5 for the first time ever, showing that the U.S. had the support of the organization and the nations of Europe. The situation changed when plans to invade Iraq were presented. Europe was concerned that the U.S. did not perceive its NATO allies as especially important any more. The Bush administration preferred ad hoc coalitions instead of relying on NATO and this revealed that the importance of NATO for the U.S. had decreased. On the other hand, the administration still stressed the importance of NATO functioning as the most important security organization in Europe. This suggests that the concern that the European Union will become stronger and more influential militarily is present in the Bush administration, as well as it has been in previous U.S. governments.

5.3.5 The Patterns and the Future of EU-US Relations

The two periods which are discussed in this thesis do have a lot in common when regarding American responses to regionalism in Europe. During both the Cold War and the War on Terror it becomes clear that the U.S. supports regionalism in Europe as long as it serves American interests.

The importance of European integration as a deterrent against Communist expansion during the Cold War cannot be underestimated. In addition, the American goal of making Europe strong enough to start paying for its own defense was a strong motive for supporting regionalism in the region. However, in the period from 1969 to 1977 when the U.S. was weakened, it is possible to see how support for integration decreased as the U.S. tried to establish “special relationships” instead.

During the War on Terror we can see the same pattern concerning the war in Iraq and its aftermath. The opposition from parts of the EU encouraged the U.S. to once again establish “special relationships.” Countries from Eastern and Central Europe were more sympathetic to the policies of the Bush administration, and this led to this administration’s emphasis on individual agreements with these states. The latest example of this is the plans for deploying a missile defense system in Eastern Europe, more specifically in Poland and the Czech Republic. When the U.S. “bypasses” the EU and NATO in making the decision to place missiles and radars in Europe, it also undermines the process of European integration. According to the Norwegian Foreign

Minister, Jonas Gahr Støre, there is not a consensus in NATO for the execution of these plans. The official statement from the secretary general Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is that “All allies agree a threat from ballistic missiles exist.”¹²⁴ This is again an example of how the Bush administration appears to be dividing the EU and NATO by undermining their authority. At the present time, the issue is being debated at an informal NATO meeting in Oslo. To repeat the point of the argument in this thesis; the pattern which emerges from all of the responses by the U.S. to European regionalism is that they will vary according to their relevance to U.S. interests. This seems very clear when reviewing the foreign policy of the current administration, but it is not a new phenomenon.

The concern of Europe developing into a “third force” is present in almost every administration during the Cold War and the War on Terror. It would seem that the U.S. favors regionalism in Europe as long as its independence does not contradict with American interests. The concern with Europe and the EU as a “third force” appears to be growing along with the development of European integration. The Bush administration still stresses that the military integration of Europe should develop within the Atlantic framework, allowing the U.S. to have influence over the process and thus preventing the EU from emerging as a military counterweight.

In the introductory chapter to this thesis, the author posed the following question: “Seeing the world through a realist lens, can the EU in the future fill the role as a superpower and a counterweight to the U.S., and in this context, what are the American responses to this hypothetical reality?” The French view has long been that the EU would perform some sort of balance against the U.S. Geir Lundestad argues that this view must be abandoned, but he also believes that the EU should not “consistently follow the U.S. lead.”¹²⁵ Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras also argue that individuals in Europe claim that the EU must speed up the process of military integration in order to establish a power balance to the U.S. The author of this thesis agrees with their conclusion that: “If...they attempt to become a U.S. in the place of the U.S., then this

¹²⁴ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO united on missile defence approach”, 19 April 2007, <http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2007/04-april/e0419a.html> (accessed 20 April 2007).

¹²⁵ Lundestad 2007: 22.

effort will not succeed.”¹²⁶ There are two reasons for this: “Firstly, the U.S. knows better than anyone how to be itself, and secondly, in such a situation, the EU risks losing all the advantages it enjoys and which make it so successful in the current world, capable of attracting scores of other countries.”¹²⁷ It is uncertain what will become of the role of the EU in international politics, but it is likely that the U.S. will probably not respond positively to a more powerful and integrated Europe if it does not correspond with its interests. The problems in transatlantic relations will not disappear in the near future.

¹²⁶ Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras, “Introduction: Rupture and Continuity in Transatlantic relations,” in *EU-US Relations: Repairing the Transatlantic Rift*, ed. Nikos Kotzias and Petros Liacouras, (New York: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2006), 11.

¹²⁷ Kotzias and Liacouras 2006: 11.

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